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국제학석사학위논문

**Hong Kong's “Imagined Communities”:  
The Emergence of the Post-90s Generation**

홍콩의 “상상의 공동체”:  
지우링허우(九零後) 세대의 등장

2016 년 8 월

서울대학교 국제대학원  
국제학과 국제협력전공  
양 지 연

Master's Thesis

**Hong Kong's "Imagined Communities":  
The Emergence of the Post-90s Generation**

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Graduate Program in International Cooperation  
In Fulfilment of the Requirements  
For the Degree of Master of International Studies

August 2016

**Graduate School of International Studies  
Seoul National University**

# **Hong Kong's Imagined Communities: The Emergence of the Post-90s Generation**

홍콩의 “상상의 공동체”: 지우링허우(九零後) 세대의 등장

지도교수: 김 태 균

이 논문을 국제학석사학위논문으로 제출함

2016년 8월

서울대학교 국제대학원

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## **Abstract**

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Given the pathway of the continuous protests in Hong Kong peninsula, by utilising the Nationalism framework by Benedict Anderson, this study aimed to investigate the characteristics in the political participation of the Hong Kong's post-90s generation. I propose three common yet unique characteristics in the region's recent political scene: (1) continuity of the political protest, and the similarity in terms of the protest personality (political), (2) exceptional emphasis on Hong Kong, Hongkoners, Hong Kong values, and (3) Hong Kong's post-90s generation as the newly emerged non-state actor in the Hong Kong's political scene.

Indeed, this is an eye-opening change and a new paradigm for Hong Kong. So-called post-90s generation of Hong Kong, as the first generation under the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government having become the vanguards of the region's major protests meant the fundamental shift to political conflicts from the existing socio-economic based anti-sentiment against the mainland China.

Having focal point lied on the post-90s generation, this study has found that the very generation desires for democracy of which is ultimately conflicting with the very core and the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party. In hoping to lay some ground work for the future research on the Hong Kong study as well as the cross-strait issues, this study examines the region's political elements.

**Keywords:** “Imagined Communities”, Nationalism, Ethnic Identity, ‘One China’ Policy, ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy, Hongkongers, Post-90s Generation

Student ID: 2013-23729

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# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

The city of Hong Kong, after a long British rule that is 156 years to be precise, was handed over back to her motherland, the People's Republic of China on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1997. Designed by *Deng Xiaoping*, by implementing the groundbreaking concept called the 'One Country, Two Systems' on Hong Kong, enabled the city's existing establishments and foreign investments from the earlier British colonial era. Hong Kong and China by complementing each other's' advantages, the city developed as the Asia's main hub today whilst China could have had been maintaining her rapid and persistent economic growth for past decades.

While the policy has hugely contributed to the economic development for both in the early stage (1984-1997), the city since the handover has been undergoing with numerous protests, apart from the handful number of rhetorical protests such as memoir protest to Tiananmen Massacre 1997 and anti-Japan protests. Mainly, the major protests are against the central government, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) due to the conflicting views in regard to the city's autonomy. Today, 19 years since the handover, endowed with high autonomy under the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government –except for the defense and the foreign affairs–, the city has been going through continuous political unrest. Led by the young students, the city's democratic attempt in 2014 namely known as the 'Umbrella Movement' was exposed across the globe; the first riots of massive scale of pro-democracy protests since the 1960s. Nonetheless, apart from the demonstration ubiquitously known, the very region for good few years has been going under the political turbulence over the years; anti-Communist textbook, anti-Mandarin use in public school and etc.

Given the pathway of the long-standing Hong Kong identity (local identity) instead of its ethnicity which is Han-Chinese and the strong attachment as the ‘Hongkongers’, this research firstly by visiting the vast literature reviews on Hong Kong study diagnoses the current situation Hong Kong is in. Via thorough examination, I propose three common yet unique characteristics in the region’s recent political scene: (1) continuity of the political protest, and the similarity in terms of the protest personality (political), (2) exceptional emphasis on Hong Kong, Hongkoners, Hong Kong values, and (3) Hong Kong’s post-90s generation as the newly emerged non-state actor in the Hong Kong’s political scene.

Benedict Anderson’s pioneering work on the notion of nationalism, namely known as the “Imagined Communities” as an analytical framework, this study examines the future trajectory of China – Hong Kong relations under the fruitful academic model by the father of School of Constructivism. By employing the mixed methods, has conducted a primary data, carried out the 1:1 in-depth structured interview (qualitative)<sup>1</sup> and survey questionnaire (quantitative)<sup>2</sup> throughout the author’s 24 days-long field trip to Hong Kong. By utilising the author’s own primary data as well as the research design, this study aims to illustrate Hong Kong under Anderson’s tool firstly by the descriptive analysis (focusing on how and why are Hong Kong’s post-90s generation is different) followed by the regression analysis (focusing on the correlation between the variables to see the indicators which hold the explanation power). Ultimately, this research under Anderson’s model will draw conclusions as well as the future implications from the findings of this study.

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<sup>1</sup> Appendix II, 1:1 Interview dialogue (blank sheet)

<sup>2</sup> Appendix I, Survey Questionnaire

## 1.2 Significance of Hong Kong Study

Today, it utterly is profound to understand China's global emergence in its totality. Indeed, the ubiquitous narrative of 'Rising China' is no longer a prediction but a solid, happening fact. More than two centuries ago, the French emperor, Napoléon (1804-1815) left a famous quote, "Asia's China is a sleeping lion. Let her sleep. Once it awakes, it will shake the entire world."<sup>3</sup> In today's 21<sup>st</sup> century, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping gave an eye-opening speech about the 'sleeping lion' in his visit to E.U. Headquarters in Brussels in 2014.

*"China was a sleeping lion.*

*Today, the lion has woken up, but it is peaceful, pleasant and civilised.*

*China will not stir up trouble, but we are also not afraid of trouble."*<sup>4</sup>

Once the above statements were released and went viral online, it sparked a lively debate in the international media as Xi's bold, metaphorical speech on China as a 'lion' has adamantly shown the Beijing's fearless and provocative confidence. Evidently, it is true that many countries have seldom referred the country as 'lion' along with the 'dragon' nonetheless, Xi was the first Chinese premier to call herself that. Just how Napoléon once prophetically predicted, along with her rising assertiveness the awakening is now shaking the world.<sup>5</sup> Today, she doesn't just have capacity to exert her

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<sup>3</sup> Gries, Peter Hays. *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*, University of California Press, 2004, p.45

<sup>4</sup> South China Morning Post, "Xi Jinping says world has nothing to fear from awakening of 'peaceful lion'", 28<sup>th</sup> March 2014

<sup>5</sup> Shambaugh, David. *China goes global: the partial power*. Oxford University Press. 2013.

influence to various sphere including the international economy, politics but in fact, she does exercise the power to secure her best interest; for instance, aggressiveness in willingness to win over in the territorial disputes with Japan and Philippines.

Meanwhile, there hardly is exogenous variable that could bring harm to China in contemporary world however endogenously, the very country of its vast territories which is composed of multiple languages, cultures and customs within the state faces myriad of hurdles. Martin Jaques sees China as a civilisation-state<sup>6</sup> instead of the conventional term, the nation-state. On top of maintaining fifty-five ethnic minorities, given the Hong Kong's growing dislocation under the 'One Country, Two Systems', Beijing has been struggling to assimilate Hong Kong into China. Nonetheless, above all, Beijing's long-cherished desire for a unification with Taiwan, the ultimate goal is yet to be solved.

In Taiwan, as will be same for the elsewhere, there is a number of conflicting interest groups. On one hand, there is a pool of pro-Beijing where lies the optimistic view of the policy as the right formula –if were to reunify– while on the other hand, there are pessimists who are strongly against the idea. However, a growing dislocation in Hong Kong has been amplified through the region's continuous protests in the past years. Seeing the very policy which was initially aimed for them on Hong Kong, thanks to the learning effect, Taiwan could indirectly experience the very formula of the 'One Country, Two Systems'. In short, in the eyes of Taiwan, Hong Kong crisis tests the model proposed by Beijing to Taiwan.

Taiwan's recent presidential election in earlier 2016 resulted in displacing the Kuomintang(KMT), the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)'s victory in both the presidential and legislative elections. This was a 3<sup>rd</sup> turnover in 8 years and this meant

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<sup>6</sup> Jacques, Martin. *When China rules the world: The end of the western world and the birth of a new global order*. Penguin. 2009.

Taiwan may have consolidated the region's democracy as she has passed the two turnover test" (Huntington, 1991).<sup>7</sup> Various other reasons behind such outcome of the election aside, there is a common view that Hong Kong provides model for Taiwan in other direction. In managing Hong Kong crisis, Beijing's repressive and undemocratic moves would make Taiwan to be reluctant for accepting the current Beijing's basis for the reunification policy, 'One Country, Two Systems' as it would be detrimental to the hard-won freedom and democracy in Taiwan.<sup>8</sup>

To sum, as Hong Kong crisis could have repercussions for Taiwan, the very implementation of the policy on Hong Kong doesn't just end in Hong Kong but could backfire on China – Taiwan; the cross-strait relations. The fate of the feasibility of Beijing's approach in reaching its goal of unification could be depending on the management of Hong Kong crisis. To put this in another way, losing Hong Kong possibly could mean a great threat to China in terms of maintaining the stability of its nation-state, for the world, if this goes beyond control could mean a ground-breaking change in Asia's balancing. Meanwhile Beijing should give utmost strength to win the hearts and the minds of Hong Kong as well as Taiwan, however simultaneously should also bear in mind to seek for a silver bullet; in order to preserve China's rhetorical policy namely the 'One China' policy under the ruling party of Chinese Communist Party. Only then, the lion would be immune from tail shaking the body thus could hope for a foreseeable future of greater China as it desires to be.

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<sup>7</sup> Huntington Samuel, *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, Normand and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991

<sup>8</sup> Washington Post, "Taiwan's rejection of 'one country's two systems'", October 16, 2014



## **Chapter 2. Literature Review**

### **2.1 Hong Kong's Continuous Political Unrest & Upheaval**

#### **2.1.1 Umbrella Movement 2014**

Today, in the 18 years since the handover in 1997, the Peoples' Republic of China though some may arguably disagree, honoured its fair share of commitment to the principle of 'One Country, Two Systems'. Nonetheless, the very review was completely shaken and overturned by the city's democratic attempt last year, the first riots of massive scale of pro-democracy protests since the 1960s. On 26<sup>th</sup> September 2014, remarking the 17<sup>th</sup> year anniversary of the sovereignty return, an 87-day-long pro-democracy protest namely known, as the 'Umbrella Movement' has taken placed; ended on 15<sup>th</sup> of December. The focal tension of the demonstration lied on the methods of selecting the Chief Executive (CE) of HKSAR. With the launch of campaign, "Occupy Central with Love and Peace", tens of thousands of people were poured into street and started occupying main roads in Admiralty and Wan Chai –the central business districts of Hong Kong–.

The region's mini-constitution of which the locals calls the 'common law' states that Hong Kong will have a gradual democratic reforms through gradual change for the ultimate goal of direct elections by democratic means as the Basic Law has decreed. However, only after a decade of the sovereignty transfer, in 2017, Beijing for the first time stated the specifics of the gradual universal suffrage she promised. For such reasons, there were high expectations for the upcoming universal suffrage. On 29<sup>th</sup> December 2007, the Standing Committee of China's tenth National People's Congress (NPCSC) at its thirty-first session released its "Decision on Issues Relating to the Methods of Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for

Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage”.

**Decision on ‘Methods of Selecting the Chief Executive of the HKSAR’<sup>9</sup>**

(Thirty-first session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress,  
on 29<sup>th</sup> December 2007)

“The election of the fourth Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the year 2012 shall not be implemented by the method of universal suffrage.”

“...the election of the fifth Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the year 2017 may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage; that after the Chief Executive is selected by universal suffrage, the election of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may be implemented by the method of electing all the members by universal suffrage.”

“...in selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by the method of universal suffrage, a broadly representative nominating committee shall be formed. The nominating committee may be formed with reference to the current provisions regarding the Election Committee.”

“...the nominating committee shall in accordance with democratic procedures nominate a certain number of candidates for the office of the Chief Executive, who is to be elected through universal suffrage by all registered electors of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and to be appointed by the Central People’s Government.”

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<sup>9</sup> Legislative Council Hong Kong (LegCoHK). “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues relating to Universal Suffrage”, p.2-3

Shortly after the release of the above statement, the peoples of Hong Kong weren't satisfied with the government not adopting the universal suffrage for the 2012 elections however, the hopeful drawings of the next elections in the year 2017 eased the demands of those pro-democracy protests in regular basis. Even after the 2007 decision, the very city was challenged by many attempts by the central government such as an introduction of Chinese national education 2012, so-called the 'patriotic education' or alternatively 'political education' that is the similar education from the Mainland China; 'China model' textbook that is a pro-Communist Party account of China's history and political system glorifying China's single Communist Party rule while glossing over more brutal aspects of its rule.

Seven years after the first statement of the methods in electing HKSAR CE, the Umbrella Movement began on 26<sup>th</sup> September 2014, after the Chinese NPCSC in August 2014 announced its decision on proposed reforms to the Hong Kong electoral system. Changes were that Hong Kong would have a system where Beijing will basically vet two to three candidates for voters to choose from. Also, the candidates would have to gain at more than 50 percent of nominations from an electoral committee of 1,200 people, most of whom are representatives of business interests in Hong Kong.

## **Decision on ‘Methods of Selecting the Chief Executive of the HKSAR’<sup>10</sup>**

(Tenth session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People's Congress,  
on 31<sup>st</sup> August 2014)

“Starting from 2017, the selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage”

“Implemented method of universal suffrage:

- (1) A broadly representative nominating committee shall be formed...
- (2) The nominating committee shall nominate two to three candidates for the office of Chief Executive in accordance with democratic procedures. Each candidate must have the endorsement of more than half of all the members of the nominating committee.
- (3) All eligible electors of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have the right to vote in the election of the Chief Executive and elect one of the candidates for the office of Chief Executive in accordance with law.
- (4) The Chief Executive-elect, after being selected through universal suffrage, will have to be appointed by the Central People's Government.”

Amongst the many protests of hostile anti-mainlander rhetoric burst out in Hong Kong, the recent unrest particularly featured a distinctive element, the youthful involvement. This manifestation of the youthful involvement however, was rather a predicted scene as these groups of young people were at the vanguard of a previous protest movement –the protest against the introduction of Chinese national education–.

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<sup>10</sup> South China Morning Post, “Full text: NPC Standing Committee decision on Hong Kong 2017 election framework”, 31<sup>st</sup> August 2014

Sensing a deep infringement of democracy, the Hong Kong Federation of Students began organising protest outside the government headquarter on 22<sup>nd</sup> September. The students eventually took over the central government complex on the 26<sup>th</sup>. The young demanded free elections, the resignation of the current CE, Chun-ying Leung as well as the police chief, Wai-hung Tsang. *Xi* along with the central government did not answer to students demand and instead he called the protest illegal that “law and order must be maintained”.<sup>11</sup> With the use of pepper spray and the tear gas by the HKSAR police force, the Umbrella Movement had massive media coverage across countries, however the protest, all in all, did not achieve what the student initially demanded.

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<sup>11</sup> Telegraph, “Xi Jinping Declared Hong Kong Protest is illegal”, 12<sup>th</sup> November 2014

### 2.1.2 Newly Emerged Non-State Actor: Hong Kong's Post-90s Generation

In fact, whilst the legal term has been the Hong Kong permanent residence, Hongkonger has been the term for the ones who is strongly connected to the local culture. And this local identity was recognised on the world stage, with the 'Hongkonger' and 'Hongkongese' added to the Oxford English Dictionary.<sup>12</sup> Given the city is a largely homogenous society as the dominant population is the 94% of Chinese (ethnically Han-Chinese), this strong local identity of Hong Kong does not fade away but persists sternly. Portrayed by the continuous unrestful incidents in Hong Kong peninsula, it is evident that there has been a resilient resistance by the numerous conflicting interest groups. Admittedly, the protesters in the city has been remained the somewhat same figures for the last 20 years, however the city's pro-democracy protest in 2014 featured "many of new faces and the groups", says the Hong Kong studies specialist Chang.<sup>13</sup>

In fact, rather than one-time political articulation, number of figures has been continuously appeared in the political scene. For instance, Joshua Wong who is the founder of the Scholarism, has been the lead against the introduction of the pro-Communist Party textbooks in Hong Kong. The very recent incident in Hong Kong, which was the 'Fishball Revolution', the police supervision over the illegal street stalls were also accompanied by the young students. The abduction of the Causeway booksellers who are widely known as the critical of the CCP, were also amplified by the sit-ins by the young students-led organisations.

Unlike the previous groups of post-80s generation, so-called Hong Kong's post-90s generation have shown its collective and organised student-led groups such as Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) and Scholarism. They have been continuously

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<sup>12</sup> South China Morning Post, "Hongkonger makes it to world stage with place in the Oxford English Dictionary", Wednesday, 19 March, 2014

<sup>13</sup> 프레시안, "홍콩, 2016 '어묵 혁명'은 왜 일어났나?", 2016년 4월 20일

demanding for universal suffrage and protecting for any breached civil liberties they enjoy.

What is distinctive of this very generation is that at such a young age, they join the political movements for one, by asking for an inclusion for the political process. Looking closely, there are three unique characteristics found in the patterns of this young generation's political involvement; (1) continuity of the political protest, and the similarity in terms of the protest personality (political), (2) exceptional emphasis on Hong Kong, Hongkongers, Hong Kong values, and (3) Hong Kong's post-90s generation. However, so far there is no academic definition in regard to the Hong Kong's post-90s – except for economic perspective such as consumption pattern analysis–. Therefore, a sufficient explanation for the very generation's high profile of political involvement remains puzzled. The *jiulinghou* (in Mandarin), this generation has appeared to be the vanguards of the Hong Kong's recent political scenes, and the convictions and the values this generation cherishes, and ultimately how this conflicts with the both government of HKSAR government as well as the Beijing (CCP).

## 2.2 Hong Kong Identity & Hongkongers

### 2.2.1 History of Hong Kong Identity & Hongkongers

#### **The Emergence of ‘Hong Kong Man’ (香港人)**

“Something unique has been emerging from Hong Kong’s cities: it is Hong Kong Man. He is go-getting and highly competitive, tough for survival, quick-thinking and flexible. He wears western clothes, speaks English or expects his children to do so, drinks western alcohol, has sophisticated tastes in cars and household gadgetry, and expects life to provide a constant stream of excitement and new openings. But he is not British or western (merely westernised). At the same time, he is not Chinese in the same way that the citizens of the People’s Republic of China are Chinese. Almost alone in the Chinese world Hong Kong has not adopted Putonghua (Mandarin) as the lingua franca: instead Cantonese holds sway”.<sup>14</sup>

A fundamental concept of what a ‘Hong Kong Man’ (香港人) was drawn by Hugh Baker in 1984, which shortly buzzed for the studies of peoples of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong identity that comes from a unique historical path. Given the people residing in Hong Kong are Han Chinese, the illustrated concept of ‘Hong Kong man’, ‘Hong Konger’, ‘Hongkongese’ –interchangeable terms– was a strange phenomenon, as right up until then, they were simply referred as Chinese in Hong Kong or Hong Kong residents.

Two years before the eminent quote by Baker, an interesting research on Hong Kong was carried out. With an employment of the term ‘ethnicity’, Honig (1982) illustrated

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<sup>14</sup> Baker, Hugh. “Life in the Cities: The Emergence of Hong Kong Man,” *The China Quarterly* Volume 95, 1983, p.478-479



the differences within the Han Chinese.<sup>15</sup> This was more than an interesting academic work, but rather a striking one because the use of the ‘ethnicity’ would be rather natural if were to describe the China’s fifty-five ethnic minority groups, namely known as the autonomous regions, however the very term was employed to address the Han Chinese. It was apparent, the mainstream views on the Hong Kong was that the very territory was undergoing the identity crisis.

In the 1980s, as the methodological framework of the identity, the dichotomy model of ‘Hongkonger’ (香港人) versus ‘Chinese’ (中國人) was widely used by the Hong Kong sociologists. As handful number of scholars in the region popularly employed the model, so did the Liu & Kuan (1988). According to a survey drawn by two Hong Kong sociologists in 1985 (Liu & Kuan, 1988), “59.5 percent of the respondents identified themselves as Hongkongers whilst the remaining 36.2 percent identified as Chinese.”<sup>16</sup> The three-fifths of Hong Kong’s Chinese population opting for Hong Kong identity and self-perceiving themselves as Hongkongers were “striking” so as the tremendous sense of the peoples’ attachment to Hong Kong.

Through mid-90s, the concerning identity matter went from ‘identity crisis’ to the ‘dual identity crisis’ (a matter of either a Chinese or a Hongkonger), shortly after went on to the discourse of ‘mixed identities’. Then in 1997, the year of the handover, two distinguished Hong Kong scholars in the social science department boldly stated that the existing dichotomous model for the study of ethnic identity has outlived thus should introduce a new model named as ‘One-in-four-choice’. So-called, ‘Dichotomy to One-in-four-Choices’, the new model by Chung & Tai<sup>17</sup> meant the end of the deficiency of

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<sup>15</sup> Honig, Emily. *Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei people in Shanghai 1850-1980*, Yale University Press, 1992

<sup>16</sup> Liu, Zhaojia, and Hsin-chi Kuan. *The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese*. Chinese University Press, 1988.

<sup>17</sup> Robert Chung and Edward Tai are the Director and the Senior Data Analyst of Public Opinion Programme at the University of Hong Kong, respectively. The Public Opinion Programme at

the old binary model asking whether one self-perceives as a Chinese(中國人) or as a Hongkonger(香港人) which could overlap with each other but instead by providing a range of four choices, could enable to narrow down some ambivalent answers –such as ‘I don’t know’ or –‘Hard to say’– to more specific answers;<sup>18</sup> 1)Hongkonger (香港人), 2)Hongkonger in China (中國的香港人), 3)Chinese (中國人), and 4)Chinese in Hong Kong (香港的中國人). The ‘Hongkonger in China’ (中國的香港人) as a broader sense of ‘Hongkonger’ means those primarily sees as ‘Hongkonger living in China’ whilst the ‘Chinese in Hong Kong’ as a broader sense of ‘Chinese’ means the ‘Chinese living in Hong Kong’.

In effort to lessen the embedded blind spot within the methodological framework regarding the absolute strength of identities either in the dichotomous model or the one-in-four-choices model, Chung & Tai later added rating questions to rate the respondents’ strength of their ‘Hongkongers’ and ‘Chinese’ identities separately using a 0-10 scale. In June 2007, the survey further enhanced by bringing in the concept of “citizens of People’s Republic of China”, “members of the Chinese race”, “Asians” and “global citizens”. This inclusion of the four more identities was to serve the purpose of fathoming the strength, in other words, to depict a clearer picture of identities in terms of the culture and ethnic.

What is remarkable or should say ironic is that Hongkongers, notwithstanding the ethnic group of ‘Han Chinese’ –in other words, shares same roots of the ancestors thus

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the University of Hong Kong, namely known as the HKUPOP is well known for its impartiality and professionalism in collecting, studying and interpreting public opinion in Hong Kong, and is a highly respected programme in the region. Up to this date, POP has conducted more than 1,000 independent surveys, covering media development, electoral studies, policy issues, and youth studies.

<sup>18</sup> Chung & Tai (2002) “Ethnic Identity of Hong Kong People: An Academic Question turned Political”

blood-related– or the national identity (Chinese, or more precisely a citizen of People’s Republic of China), by employing the term ‘ethnic identity’ to identify themselves as different from the ‘Chinese’ but the ‘Hongkongers’. This ultimately is opposed to their ethnic or national identity. In terms of blood ties as well as the ethnic ties, even though the Hongkongers are classified as ‘Chinese’, the very word, *ethnic* is used to show their collective identity, of which otherises them from the Mainlanders, says a distinguished anthropology scholar who specialises in Hong Kong (Chang , 2003).

### 2.2.2 Today’s Exceptional Emphasis: Hong Kong and Hong Kong Values

One of the many emphases heard in Hong Kong’s recent political upheaval is the exceptional emphasis on Hong Kong and Hong Kong values. In particular, Hong Kong’s voice on the proud system of the Basic Law –in Hong Kong, locals often call this as the ‘common law’– and other various establishments in its society in general, which have led to the city’s prosperity. The stress on so-called ‘HongKongness’ is truly a new phenomenon and a good attention must be paid given the past’s main focal point was about the anti-sentiments based on the mainlanders’ behaviour. For the past decade, the very anti-sentiments Hongkongers had towards the mainland Chinese were well fed by the annoyance and the inconvenience Hongkongers had from the baby formula shortage, unauthorised street sellers dodging the tax duty and on. In other words, it was the Hong Kong’s reaction to the mainlanders’ such a deed, with no notable slogans related to Hong Kong per se.

**<Table 2-1> Hong Kong People's Ethnic Identity<sup>19</sup>**

調查日期 Date of survey	半年結成功 樣本 Total Sample(Half- yearly)	半年結次樣 本人數 Sub- sample(Half- yearly)	香港人 Hongkonger	中國的香港 人 Hongkonger in China	香港的中國人 Chinese in Hong Kong	中國人 Chinese	混合身分 Mixed Identity	其他(請列 明) Other	唔知/難講 DK/HS
1-6/2016	1007	573	41.9%	25.1%	12.9%	17.8%	38.0%	1.3%	0.9%
7-12/2015	1011	687	40.2%	27.4%	13.0%	18.1%	40.4%	0.9%	0.4%
1-6/2015	1003	678	36.3%	27.4%	13.1%	22.1%	40.5%	0.3%	0.8%
7-12/2014	1016	660	42.3%	24.3%	15.0%	17.8%	39.3%	0.6%	0.0%
1-6/2014	1026	660	40.2%	27.1%	11.6%	19.5%	38.7%	0.2%	1.3%
7-12/2013	1015	628	34.8%	27.6%	15.0%	21.8%	42.6%	0.8%	0.1%
1-6/2013	1055	677	38.2%	24.3%	12.0%	23.0%	36.3%	1.1%	1.6%
7-12/2012	1019	687	27.2%	33.1%	16.1%	21.3%	49.2%	0.6%	1.7%
1-6/2012	1001	560	45.6%	22.8%	11.5%	18.3%	34.3%	1.1%	0.7%
7-12/2011	1016	541	37.7%	25.3%	17.8%	16.6%	43.1%	0.6%	2.1%
1-6/2011	520	520	43.8%	21.3%	10.3%	23.5%	31.7%	0.4%	0.6%
7-12/2010	1013	1013	35.5%	27.6%	13.8%	21.1%	41.4%	0.4%	1.5%
1-6/2010	1004	1004	25.3%	31.3%	14.8%	27.8%	46.0%	0.4%	0.5%
7-12/2009	1007	1007	37.6%	23.9%	13.1%	24.2%	37.0%	0.2%	1.0%
1-6/2009	1002	1002	24.7%	32.0%	13.3%	29.3%	45.3%	0.2%	0.4%
7-12/2008	1016	1016	21.8%	29.6%	13.0%	34.4%	42.6%	0.5%	0.7%
1-6/2008	1012	1012	18.1%	29.2%	13.3%	38.6%	42.5%	0.1%	0.7%
7-12/2007*	1011	1011	23.5%	31.5%	16.0%	27.2%	47.5%	0.7%	1.1%
1-6/2007	1016	1016	23.4%	31.8%	16.7%	26.4%	48.5%	0.3%	1.4%
7-12/2006*	1011	1011	22.4%	24.3%	20.1%	31.8%	44.4%	0.6%	0.7%
1-6/2006*	1018	1018	24.8%	25.1%	14.9%	34.6%	40.0%	0.3%	0.3%
7-12/2005	1017	1017	24.8%	26.5%	16.9%	30.7%	43.4%	0.0%	1.1%
1-6/2005	1029	1029	24.0%	21.2%	14.7%	36.4%	35.9%	0.5%	3.3%
7-12/2004	1007	1007	25.9%	23.1%	16.2%	31.6%	39.3%	0.4%	2.8%
1-6/2004	1027	1027	28.0%	21.2%	14.3%	33.0%	35.5%	0.4%	3.1%
7-12/2003	1059	1059	24.9%	23.4%	15.6%	32.5%	39.0%	0.3%	3.3%
1-6/2003	2078	2078	32.6%	20.8%	13.5%	30.7%	34.2%	0.5%	2.1%
7-12/2002	2043	2043	30.0%	21.7%	14.7%	31.1%	36.3%	0.5%	2.1%
1-6/2002	2091	2091	29.9%	20.7%	15.5%	30.4%	36.2%	0.2%	3.5%
7-12/2001	2077	2077	29.0%	24.2%	14.0%	28.7%	38.2%	0.4%	3.8%
1-6/2001	2067	2067	33.8%	20.0%	14.7%	28.3%	34.7%	0.2%	3.1%
7-12/2000	2127	2127	36.3%	23.0%	14.2%	21.3%	37.1%	0.7%	4.7%
1-6/2000	2210	2210	37.5%	22.5%	15.9%	19.0%	38.4%	0.5%	4.6%
7-12/1999	1660	1660	33.5%	22.6%	17.0%	23.6%	39.6%	0.4%	2.9%
1-6/1999	1578	1578	41.4%	22.0%	13.2%	17.5%	35.2%	0.7%	5.1%
7-12/1998	1587	1587	36.6%	23.5%	16.7%	19.9%	40.2%	0.4%	2.9%
1-6/1998	1586	1586	32.2%	18.3%	17.4%	28.2%	35.7%	0.3%	3.6%
7-12/1997	2080	2080	35.9%	23.6%	19.9%	18.0%	43.5%	0.3%	2.5%

(Source: Hong Kong University Public Opinion Polls (HKUPOP))

<sup>19</sup> HKUPOP, People's Ethnic Identity: "You would identify yourself as a Hongkonger/Chinese/Chinese in Hong Kong/Hongkonger in China: (per poll)"

In fact, we can witness the preference on Hongkonger as an ethnic identity is proportional to the Beijing's interference on Hong Kong. Employed with the methodological framework of Chung & Tai, the HKUPOP survey carried out a half-yearly opinion survey asking of 'Ethnic Identity' to Hong Kong Residents. The respondents were asked to choose one answer from the given options among 'Hongkonger', 'Hongkonger in China', 'Chinese in Hong Kong', 'Chinese', 'Mixed Identity', 'Other' and 'None'. For the year first half year of 2011(anti-Putonghua use in Hong Kong public school protest), first half year of 2012 (anti-Communist textbook introduction protest) and throughout whole year of 2014 (Umbrella Movement) and onwards, the high percentage is captured via <Table 2-1>, a complied statistics of half-yearly report (1997-2016) on the Hong Kong people's ethnic identity since the handover. In contrast to the other times of the year, whilst the 'Hongkongers' dramatically have risen, the perception as 'Chinese' has notably shrank.

The most recent survey findings up-to-date is first half of this year 2016, the survey response is utterly shocking as the record showed of 'Hongkonger' as the highest at 41.9%, followed by the 'Hongkonger in China' (25.1%), 'Chinese' (17.8%), 'Chinese in Hong Kong' (12.9%) and 'Other' (1.3%). In fact, this record of ethnic identity as a 'Hongkonger' at 42.3% was the fourth-highest record since the handover 1997 that is after the survey in first half of 2012 (45.6%) and in first half of 2011 (43.8%) and second half of 2014 (42.3%). The self-perception on ethnic identity as 'Hongkonger' in 2016 has almost doubled whilst 'Chinese' is half of 2005. As apparent in the table, the year between 2004 and 2009 stayed steady at range around early 20% to mid 30%, it is evident that the recent survey results feature drastic increase. In a nutshell, in the earlier post-handover period may have been spread out evenly and the most recognised ethnic identity took turns, the Hong Kong identity over time does not fade away but persists and dramatically grew. Consequently, this amplified sense of dislocation, in other words not recognising one as a Chinese ethnic but the strong belongingness to local identity is a great worrisome to Beijing for its ethnic cleavage.

While the term ‘Hong Kong residents’ or the ‘Chinese residing in Hong Kong’ would be precious terms, the word ‘Hongkongers’ as well as the ‘Hongkongese’ were added to the Oxford dictionary.<sup>20</sup> With recognition on Hongkongers from the West aside, perhaps such academic work was rather a troublesome in the eyes of Beijing, the day after the HKUPOP’s release (on 28 December 2011) on the findings of “in terms of absolute rating, people’s identification with ‘Hongkonger’ has reached a ten-year high, while that of ‘Chinese’ has dropped to a 12-year low”, the Director of the Publicity, Cultural and Sports Department of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong, Hao Tiechuan openly criticised and called the survey “unscientific” and “illogical”, because it uses a dichotomous measurement of “Hongkongers” and “Chinese”. Similarly, the severe criticisms were also followed by the leftist commentators. Departed as an academic question, it is apparent that this gradually has become rather political. As a matter of fact, Chung & Tai (2002) says, survey conducted before the handover was not of a problem, however, ones conducted in the post-handover somehow is “unscientific”.<sup>21</sup>

Nonetheless, besides the outstandingly well-coordinated statistics provided by the HKUPOP, the very institution is also well known for its excellent compilation of demographic profile of the survey respondents’. However, regrettably a separate dataset of each generation was not listed in the demographic profile of the respondents, in other words, with this survey outcome, we cannot capture the post-90s generation a separate dataset alone; the vanguards in Hong Kong’s recent political scene.

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<sup>20</sup> South China Morning Post, “‘Hongkonger’ makes it to world stage with place in the Oxford English Dictionary”, Wednesday, 19 March, 2014

<sup>21</sup> Chung & Tai, Chung & Tai (2002) “Ethnic Identity of Hong Kong People: An Academic Question turned Political”, p.8

The worrisome doesn't just end at the Hong Kong's perception on their ethnic identity, however but also on numerous agendas. According to the HKUPOP surveys, if we look at <Table 2-2>, it is clear that Hong Kong's 'Confidence in One Country's Two Systems' (half-yearly report: 1993-2016) has been dramatically decreasing. What is more is that for the very first time in the entire history of the institution's survey, in the second half of the year 2014, the new record of the highest percentage for 'not confident' was found; 51.8% to be exact. Considering the statistics on the surveys of 'Satisfaction with the Political Condition', 'Satisfaction with the Economic Condition' and 'Satisfaction with the Livelihood Condition', there has been an increase in either of 'negative' or 'quite negative', however the recent political unrest in Hong Kong for the past few years has been mostly focused on the political claims; anti-Putonghua use in public school, anti-Communist textbook, and the Umbrella Movement etc. In short, we could summarise that the among many other agendas they appeared to be unsatisfied, the repeated emphasis and the continuity in the protests mainly lie on the political agendas.

<Table 2-2> People's Confidence in 'One Country Two Systems',<sup>22</sup>

調查日期 Date of survey	半年結成功樣本 Total Sample(Half-yearly)	半年結次樣本人數 Sub-sample(Half-yearly)	有信心 Confident	冇信心 Not Confident	難講/唔知道 DK/HS	合計 Total	淨值 Net Value
1-6/2016	2008	1343	43.4%	49.9%	6.7%	100.0%	-6.5%
7-12/2015	2018	1225	46.4%	46.5%	7.1%	100.0%	0.0%
1-6/2015	2027	1197	47.3%	47.0%	5.7%	100.0%	0.3%
7-12/2014	2014	1217	41.6%	51.8%	6.6%	100.0%	-10.2%
1-6/2014	2049	1267	47.5%	45.7%	6.8%	100.0%	1.9%
7-12/2013	2022	1286	52.1%	41.0%	6.9%	100.0%	11.0%
1-6/2013	2073	1272	51.3%	41.1%	7.6%	100.0%	10.3%
7-12/2012	2066	1244	50.2%	40.9%	8.9%	100.0%	9.3%
1-6/2012	2025	1045	53.1%	37.6%	9.3%	100.0%	15.5%
7-12/2011	2043	1045	55.0%	36.6%	8.4%	100.0%	18.4%
1-6/2011	2037	1081 <sup>#</sup>	60.5%	32.8%	6.7%	100.0%	27.7%
7-12/2010	2024	2024	61.6%	30.8%	7.6%	100.0%	30.7%
1-6/2010	2009	2009	60.6%	35.0%	4.4%	100.0%	25.7%
7-12/2009	3033	3033	68.1%	26.0%	5.9%	100.0%	42.1%
1-6/2009	3046	3046	72.5%	21.7%	5.8%	100.0%	50.8%
7-12/2008	3102	3102	71.8%	21.6%	6.6%	100.0%	50.2%
1-6/2008	3039	3039	74.6%	18.7%	6.7%	100.0%	56.0%
7-12/2007	3035	3035	74.9%	18.8%	6.3%	100.0%	56.1%
1-6/2007	3040	3040	72.9%	20.8%	6.3%	100.0%	52.1%
7-12/2006	3036	3036	70.4%	23.6%	6.0%	100.0%	46.9%
1-6/2006	3045	3045	69.4%	22.6%	8.0%	100.0%	46.8%
7-12/2005	3029	3029	65.1%	25.3%	9.6%	100.0%	39.8%
1-6/2005	3061	3061	57.2%	28.2%	14.6%	100.0%	29.0%
7-12/2004	3063	3063	59.3%	28.4%	12.4%	100.0%	30.9%
1-6/2004	3090	3090	51.7%	33.1%	15.2%	100.0%	18.6%
7-12/2003	3058	3058	53.7%	30.9%	15.4%	100.0%	22.8%
1-6/2003	3109	3109	49.2%	38.4%	12.4%	100.0%	10.8%
7-12/2002	3072	3072	52.7%	34.3%	12.9%	100.0%	18.4%
1-6/2002	3182	3182	58.7%	28.3%	13.1%	100.0%	30.4%
7-12/2001	3169	3169	59.2%	27.3%	13.6%	100.0%	31.9%
1-6/2001	3126	3126	56.7%	30.4%	12.9%	100.0%	26.2%
7-12/2000	3145	3145	58.2%	27.5%	14.4%	100.0%	30.7%
1-6/2000	2152	2152	62.0%	22.5%	15.5%	100.0%	39.6%
7-12/1999	1627	1627	56.3%	29.6%	14.1%	100.0%	26.8%
1-6/1999	2112	2112	57.7%	28.3%	14.0%	100.0%	29.4%
7-12/1998	1624	1624	66.6%	21.9%	11.5%	100.0%	44.7%
1-6/1998	1600	1600	64.5%	20.8%	14.7%	100.0%	43.7%
7-12/1997	5797	5797	64.0%	18.7%	17.3%	100.0%	45.3%
1-6/1997	5965	5965	57.0%	23.8%	19.2%	100.0%	33.2%
7-12/1996	3177	3177	44.7%	31.5%	23.8%	100.0%	13.3%
1-6/1996	3380	3380	43.3%	32.6%	24.2%	100.0%	10.7%
7-12/1995	3395	3395	42.3%	35.7%	22.0%	100.0%	6.6%
1-6/1995	1206	1206	41.2%	35.8%	23.0%	100.0%	5.4%
7-12/1994	1589	1589	40.4%	41.1%	18.4%	100.0%	-0.7%
1-6/1994	1557	1557	35.0%	46.6%	18.3%	100.0%	-11.5%
7-12/1993	1650	1650	36.8%	46.6%	16.6%	100.0%	-9.7%
1-6/1993	509	509	44.0%	37.2%	18.9%	100.0%	6.8%

(Source: Hong Kong University Public Opinion Polls (HKUPOP))

<sup>22</sup> HKUPOP, "People's Confidence in One Country Two Systems"



## 2.3 Academic Discourse on Hong Kong

### 2.3.1 Anthropologists' views on Hong Kong

Along with the several cases across the continents, Kim et al. (2005) addresses the otherisation within a same ethnic group due to political and economic reasons, for instance just to name one case among the handful number of case studies, the Japan's case where the discrimination was made against the Japanese migrated to Latin America.<sup>23</sup> A renowned Hong Kong specialist, Chang who is also a co-author of the book, Hong Kong case as a separate chapter in the book, says Hong Kong's currently occurring collectivisation process is not conflicts between the aborigines of Hong Kong and the Mainlanders but between the Han-Chinese who have migrated to Hong Kong in the 80s and the Mainland's Han-Chinese.<sup>24</sup>

Among the vast and also in-depth research on Hong Kong, the region's specialist expresses how shocking it is of Hongkongers to neither mention nor remember that they did not have democracy under the British occupation in any means. To explain this, by highlighting the contrast to Beijing, says Chang that it was the respect that the British colonial government had for the notion of democracy as well as the establishment of the constitution aside gave Hongkongers the image of the era under the British occupation as the "only memories of the Hong Kong society being democratic."<sup>25</sup> Further adds Chang, this eventually resulted in the formation of thinking how the sovereignty back to Motherland China is another –if not worse– coercive and imperialistic metropole.

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<sup>23</sup> 김광익 외(2005), *종족과 민족*

<sup>24</sup> 한겨레, "인류학자들이 쓴 '종족과 민족'", 2015년 5월 5일

<sup>25</sup> 장정아(2003) "홍콩인' 정체성의 정치: 반환 후 본토자녀의 거류권 분쟁을 중심으로"

Five years later, Chang (2008) in “Our Memory, Our City: Collective Memory and Hong Kong Identity”, she argued that “in the process of searching for an identity, the Hong Kong people declare that Hong Kong is no longer a borrowed place but our city with our collective memory.” Then she ultimately suggests “indigenous identity based on the city itself and the memory its residents cherish is emerging apart from the identity based on the opposition between mainland China and Hong Kong.”<sup>26</sup> Driven by the “collective amnesia’, in search for the identity, Hongkongers by otherising the mainlanders have created their own identity even though they are ethnically, nationally identical.<sup>27</sup>

The context of “collective amnesia” was similarly touched upon by Renan long time ago. In the original context in French by Renan “Or l'essence d'une nation est que tous les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun, et aussi que tous aient oublié bien des choses.”<sup>28</sup> Of which in English translation –if were to make an arbitrary translation– would be ‘The essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things’.

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<sup>26</sup> 장정아 (2008) “Our Memory, Our City: Collective Memory and Hong Kong Identity”

<sup>27</sup> 한겨레, “인류학자들이 쓴 ‘종족과 민족’”, 2015년 5월 5일

<sup>28</sup> Renan, Earnest. ‘*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* in *Oeuvres Completes*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. 1947-61. Vol. I. p.892.

### 2.3.2 Varying Perspectives on Hong Kong's Status

Some may regard Hong Kong case as China's internal affairs, however it is more than a vibrant city. In fact, Hong Kong is statistically dealt and listed as a country in numerous renowned institutions. Hong Kong has been dealt independently across numerous spheres in both academic field and in a real life. Even though it was just for the statistical purpose, Hong Kong is listed as dealt as 'country' at World Bank, UNESCO and United Nations –though recognised as 'dependency'–, and as 'territory' for the Freedom House.

As the 'One Country, Two System' prevails, with Chief Executive as the head of its own government, executive council as the cabinet, legislative council (70 seats) in charge of the legislature and above all, the court of final appeal for the independent judiciary, Hong Kong based on the impartial rule of law enjoys the rights and the freedom.<sup>29</sup> Whilst the peoples of Hong Kong perceive themselves as Hongkongers using Cantonese, however in fact, Chinese and English are the official languages of Hong Kong. Out of total population, Cantonese speakers are the highest (89.5% of population), followed by the other Chinese dialect speakers (4.02% of population), English speakers (3.5% of population), other language speakers (1.57%) and the lastly, the Putonghua speakers (1.38% of population).<sup>30</sup> Gellner (1964) once said, "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it *invents* nations where they do not exist."<sup>31</sup>

The status of Hong Kong recognised more than a cosmopolitan, special administrative region (SAR) of China. On this count, Yahuda (1996) argued except the constitutional independence, Hong Kong has state characteristics and the practiced better

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<sup>29</sup> Gov.Hk Hong Kong, "The Facts"

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>31</sup> Gellner, Ernest, *Thought and Change*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 1964

as a state than those recognised as a state by United Nations.<sup>32</sup> Chiu (1997) sees Hong Kong along with Singapore as a “city-state”.<sup>33</sup> After a short while, a bold argument by Thomas(1999) was made, that Hong Kong is a “Absolute Nation” and “Pseudo-State”. Firstly, by bringing the conceptualisation from D. Robertson (1985) argues Hong Kong is an “Absolute Nation” as there is singular identity in terms of the Hong Kong’s ethnicity, language, religion, culture and territory and secondly, by utilising Gellner’s definition argues for a “Pseudo-State”, whilst admitting the very city cannot grant a complete status as a state.<sup>34</sup> On contrary to Thomas, Chang (2003) claimed Hong Kong neither can be seen as ‘nation’ nor a ‘state’. It is not a state, says Chang, due to its very position where by herself cannot gain or granted with the *nationality* neither from Great Britain nor China thus fallacy in the argument and it also cannot be a nation because it is ambivalent to draw a distinctive line from the Mainland except the territorial aspect.<sup>35</sup>

Yet, in Hong Kong peninsula today, we see a nationalistic-like phenomena. The post-90s generation’s resilient demands on universal suffrage and many other democratic elements, and the exceptional emphases on Hong Kong and Hong Kong values are still on-going. Consequently, the existing literatures on Hong Kong fail to provide an explanation in the recent phenomena such as high-profile action of the newly emerged post-90s generation and its assertiveness in the basis of such deed.

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<sup>32</sup> Yahuda, Michael B. *Hong Kong: China’s Challenge*. Routledge: Psychology Press. 1996

<sup>33</sup> Chiu, Stephen WK, Kong Chong Ho, and Tai-Lok Lui. *City states in the global economy: Industrial restructuring in Hong Kong and Singapore*. Westview Press. 1997.

<sup>34</sup> Thomas, Nicholas. *Democracy Denied: Identity, Civil Society and Illiberal Democracy in Hong Kong*. Aldershot: Ashgate. 1999

<sup>35</sup>장정아(2003) “홍콩인’ 정체성의 정치: 반환 후 본토자녀의 거류권 분쟁을 중심으로”

### 2.3.3 Need of New Hong Kong Study

Hugo Chavez (1999 – 2013), the formal Venezuelan President once has said, not the sending of the first man to the moon, was one of the most important event in the 20th century but was the China's decision on the 'Reform and Open' policy (改革開放).<sup>36</sup> With Deng Xiaoping's rhetoric of 'country's economic development first' (先富論), for nation's economic development, to solve the question of soon-to-be-returned Hong Kong, Deng by introducing the eye-opening concept of 'One Country, Two Systems' showed willingness to go beyond the existing socialist system and accept her economic system. An application of Deng's famous theory of 'Black cat White cat (黑貓白貓) theory, Beijing could have one political vision ('One China' policy) two economic systems; 'separating politics from economics' (政經分離).

Considering the China – Hong Kong relations in the early stage (1984-1997) in short, it was mutual interdependence via economic convergence. However, regrettably, the conflicting perspectives on the very policy of 'One Country, Two Systems' have been putting the greatest obstacle since the handover. Whilst China under 'One China' policy tries to maintain 'One Country' and assimilate Hong Kong into Chinese way of governance, Hong Kong on the other end stresses on the 'Two Systems'.

In the awakening of young students' political participation in Hong Kong, the concern is no longer just about the local identity as a Hongkonger but political opinion the Hong Kong's post-90s generation, which ultimately conflicts with the CCP or in the worst case, the very regime of the country. In the absence of the academic definition of Hong Kong's post-90s generation, a newly emerged non-state actor, a new study on the very generation

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<sup>36</sup> Zieleniec, Aleksandra. *International Chronicle*. The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 4. 2006. p.135-145

would be inevitable, in order to predict possible scenarios for the greater China region as a whole.

As we have seen under the Literature Review section, a few factors are apparent, firstly the Hong Kong's common tongue (*print-language*) is Cantonese (廣東話 or seldom referred as 香港話); it is profound not to be confused with Mandarin though they could understand however, not entirely. Secondly, a significant number of people on the opposite stance of the Chinese *official nationalism* namely known as the 'One China' policy –of whom are mostly the young generation–. Last but not the least, amongst handful number of the British heritage (Anderson calls this the *last wave*), a great number of Hong Kong residents enjoy the 'self-perception as a Hongkonger' and other British colonial legacies such as richness in high quality of liberalism –rule of law, private properties etc.–.

## Chapter 3. Analytical Framework

### 3.1 Theories of Nationalism

The notion of nationalism is no stranger in contemporary world, even to the ones irrelevant to the field of social science. Under the name of ‘nationalism’, countries could be war-prone, two strangers from different countries could be in confrontation. It gives you sense of belongingness, an engine to support a country for the sports game you watch in the era of the nation-states today. Ironically, up until about two or three decades ago, there hardly was any discussions on nationalism. Let alone academic books, the very notion was still rather new to be digested. In the absence of the blueprint for nationalism, in the year 1983, the book of nationalism with a bizarre conceptualisation of which is ubiquitously known today came to this world.

Benedict Anderson himself in the first publication of “Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism”, pinpoints one of the irritating paradoxes to the theorists of nationalism, which is the political power of nationalisms notwithstanding, the philosophical power of nationalism is insufficient that “... unlike most of other isms, nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers such as Hobbes, Tocqueville, Marx, or Weber”.<sup>37</sup> However, may have Anderson fostered the discourse of nationalism, it gave a birth to many other great scholars and writers on the field of nationalism. Since the Anderson’s pioneering work on the notion of nationalism, the research of nationalism in terms of methodology, scale, sophistication and quantity has been immensely transformed and produced handful number of distinguished scholars such as J. A. Armstrong, Ernest Gellner, P. Chatterjee, and Eric Hobsbawm and etc.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso. 1983. p.14

<sup>38</sup> Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of*

### 3.2 Benedict Anderson's "Imagined Communities"

In the eyes of Anderson, nationalism is not a product of antiquity but modernity, and coins an interesting term, the "imagined communities". With unique conceptualisation, he proposes a definition of nation as an "imagined political community", and imagined as inherently limited and sovereign.<sup>39</sup>

In illustrating of "imagined communities", Anderson brings in a handful number of interesting building blocks. The main fundamentals consist of four and those are 1) print-capitalism, 2) print-language, 3) official nationalism, and 4) last wave. Before going into the four main building blocks of the nationalism, Anderson addresses the cultural roots lied back in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, which laid a foundation for those of the four main fundamentals to have had been able to flourish. The cultural roots, Anderson gives three elements, 1) fall of religious community, 2) dynastic realm with no automatic legitimacy and 3) apprehensions of time. The summary of how and why the three cultural roots have evolved is found below in <Table 3-1>.

In its heyday, might have been taken for granted for the frames of reference, however owed to these three cultural systems, he believes they could have welcomed the dawn of the age of nationalism. These interlinked three cultural roots eventually led a "new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together".<sup>40</sup> However, says Anderson, not anything but print-capitalism produced "rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways."<sup>41</sup>

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Nationalism. 1983. rev. ed. 1991. p.12

<sup>39</sup> Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso. 1983. p.15

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p.40

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p.40



**<Table 3-1> Cultural Roots of Nationalism<sup>42</sup>**

Cultural Roots	Reasons & Results
The Fall of Religious Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effect of the explorations of the non-European world</li> <li>• Gradual demotion of the sacred language itself (Latin)</li> <li>• Sacred communities integrated by old sacred languages and religious ties were gradually fragmented, pluralised and territorialised</li> </ul>
Dynastic Realm with no Automatic Legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legitimacy derives from divinity, not from populations (subjects, not citizens then)</li> <li>• During 17<sup>th</sup> century: automatic legitimacy of sacral monarchy began its slow decline in Western Europe</li> <li>• Many dynasts started reaching for 'national' cachet as the old principle of legitimacy silently withered away</li> </ul>
Apprehensions of Time	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under religious society: people thought they must be near the end of time, in the sense that Christ's second coming could occur at any moment</li> <li>• In the absence of religion: the view was changed to 'homogeneous, empty time'</li> </ul>

### 3.2.1 Print Capitalism & Print-Language

In 18<sup>th</sup> century, two forms of imagining as a 'Nation' first flowered in Europe. The novels and newspapers were like the substitutions of the old bible. It began to manufacture in a big-scale and mechanically reproduce in regular basis –for example, the daily or weekly newspaper–. Another key factor was the primacy of capitalism. Print technology under capitalism meant printing as many books as possible in order to make profit thus had to secure many readers. However, due to saturated market for Latin, capitalists in the print industry looked out for the new market and the key was the vernacularisation. This phenomenon of vernacularising was fostered by three factors and

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p.17-32

they were 1) esotericisation of Latin (秘語化) –too sacred and hidden–, 2) impact of reformation and 3) the birth of administrative vernaculars (predated both ‘print’ and ‘religious upheaval’).

It is profound to note this phenomenon because it produced products based on the print-languages and it was read and shared by the great number of readers. Anderson argues, these print-languages laid the three bases for national consciousness. Firstly, it created and unified the field of exchange and communications which was below the Latin however, above the spoken vernaculars. Secondly, it gave a new fixity to language that in long run, this helped building a concrete image of antiquity in the ‘language’ by the infinite reproduction. Thirdly, it created languages-of-powers –different from the older administrative vernaculars–.

To sum, the exposure of the non-European world, the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation.<sup>43</sup> It enabled people in the Europe’s 18<sup>th</sup> century to imagine that ‘you’ and ‘I’ are ‘we’ thus the “imagined communities”. The Print-capitalism made possible for rapidly growing number of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways. With the only holy language, Latin gone, in the ways for the print businessmen to make profit, they decided to print in the various regions’ dialects for the mass, and via reproductions, this was shared, reread across the vast lands of Europe.

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p.49

### 3.2.2 Official Nationalism

In the absence of natural legitimacy, which was once endowed by the holy religion, the Europe's old dynasties had to seek for the new means to reserve the power. In an age of capitalism, skepticism, and science shored up the legitimacies of the old empire of the Europe's dynasties.<sup>44</sup> With dominantly apparent linguistic-nationalism around the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century in Europe, the power groups as a response choose official nationalism (coined by Seton-Watson) as a new means of legitimacy to rule. Nonetheless, Anderson points that official nationalisms were historically impossible until after the appearance of popular linguistic-nationalisms for at bottom, that these were the responses by the power groups threatened with exclusion from, or marginalisation in, popular imagined communities.<sup>45</sup>

Under the framework of Andersons' theory, all these mentioned three factors could be interpreted as harmful to the Chinese nationalism. Though it is a known fact that the very city is granted with high autonomy under the name HKSAR, however in terms of Andersons' four building blocks of what constitutes the nationalism, these pervasive factors are not aiding the nationalism towards China but the local identity of Hong Kong as if it is a nation when it's merely a city. To investigate the continuous unrest found in the territory, by having 'Official Nationalism' as a dependent variable, we would be able to find what leads to the Hong Kong's continuous nationalistic protests.

Argued by Anderson, 'Official Nationalism' was only possible and seen the light of the day as the power groups had to restore the legitimacy of the old empires once the mighty religion was no longer there to secure the natural rights. However, unlike the situation back in the olden days, Hong Kong today faces rather the opposite situation. Since the sovereignty was handed over to the motherland, the territory has been

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p.60

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p.67

undergoing the continuous political upheaval, which mostly was about the fight against the top-down nationalism policy by Beijing, the official nationalism. For instance, the notable incidents are the well-known protests such as the movement against introduction of Putonghua use in public schools and the anti-Communist textbook movement. Moreover, seemingly there is an increasing tendency among Hongkongers –especially, the young generation– towards the favour of democracy and the democratic values which indicates the confrontations between the two core values to a full-scale.

To conclude, on the contrary to how Anderson brought in the conceptualisation of the ‘Official Nationalism’ (originality owed to Seymour), as for Hong Kong’s case today is in fact the opposite as it was back then, the original framework cannot be applied as it is. Therefore, for the ‘Official Nationalism’, an evaluation on regime-in-practice (real) –specifically, an evaluation on the policy of ‘One China’, a Chinese rhetorical official nationalism policy, rather than the PRC’s regime in general– and preference for democracy (ideal) should be examined. Only then, we would capture how Hong Kong’s post-90s generation sees the Chinese official nationalism. Consequently, in the end, by investigating these *real* and *ideal*, we would be able to conduct a political view of the Hong Kong’s post-90s generation.

### 3.2.3 Last Wave

So-called the ‘Last Wave’ of nationalism, named by Anderson means the Europe’s former colonial territories in Asia and Africa. Back in the days, in the awakening of the industrial capitalism, countries were eager to expand the territories as they needed as much as consumption as the country’s massive production. However, during the late-nineteenth-century, the empires were too large and too far-flung to be ruled by a handful of nationals. Moreover, in tandem with capitalism the state was rapidly multiplying its functions, in both metropolises and the peripheries. Combined, these forces generated ‘russifying’ school-systems intended in part to produce the required subordinate cadres for state and corporate bureaucracies. Like the school systems, it was also found in the administrative sphere that the interlock between particular educational and administrative pilgrimages provided the territorial base for new ‘imagined communities’ in which ‘natives’ could come to see themselves as ‘nationals’. In a nutshell, the peripheries could learn, imitate and practice the nationalism via the people from the colonial power.

To conclude, as we have seen, for the origin and the spread of nationalism, first it was the groundwork of the cultural roots, then later was fueled by the four main building blocks which were all interlinked to each other. Given the apparent factors addressed in the literature review section, Anderson’s four building blocks as an analytical framework of this study, aims to diagnose Hong Kong’s current situation under Anderson’s model and ultimately to provide a future trajectory of China – Hong Kong relations, which also would aid to draw a yet-to-be-solved Taiwan issue.

## Chapter 4. Research Methodology

Throughout this section, the detailed descriptions of the main methods employed on the proposed framework of what constitutes Anderson's theory of nationalism, namely the "Imagined Communities" will be thoroughly addressed. Given the subject of this research is aimed at focusing on a country-specific, which is Hong Kong (of People's Republic China) to be precise, a single case study has allowed room for comprehensive research methods in both quantitative and qualitative; of which alternatively known as the mixed methods. As a secondary data, the credible statistics from a renowned institution would have been preferable however, despite many attempts in raw data retrieving, the author has conducted a primary data by designing author's very own 1:1 in-depth structured interview (qualitative)<sup>46</sup> survey questionnaire (quantitative)<sup>47</sup> were carried out in Hong Kong throughout the author's 24 days-long field trip to Hong Kong. By utilising the author's own primary data, in-depth analysis of both descriptive analysis (focusing on how and why are post-90s different from the post-80s) as well as the regression analysis (focusing on the correlation between the variables to see if the post-90s generation holds explanation power as an indicator) will be illustrated.

To serve the very purpose of this research, which is to Hong Kong's post-90s generation in the Nationalism model by Anderson to capture if the very generation is the indicator in the Hong Kong's recent political scene. To investigate the generation's featuring characteristics, to draw a comparison, the post-80s generation along with the post-90s were chosen as research subjects for the both survey and the 1:1 interview. Amongst the big range within the Hong Kong's previous generations, the reason for choosing the post-80s was firstly due to their common characteristics. In fact, the dominant ratio of the older generations in Hong Kong are either political fatigues whom

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<sup>46</sup> <Appendix 1> Structure Interview (blank sheet), p.102

<sup>47</sup> <Appendix 2> Survey Questionnaire

are terrified of the CCP as they are the members of the 1997 Tiananmen Crackdown or mostly the ones busy doing the business or indifferent towards the politics).<sup>48</sup> Apart from the pro-democratic activists amongst the older generation, a dramatic contrast by the comparison with post-90s generation could be rather expected and obvious due to its big age gap.

Nonetheless, the contrast between the two youngest generations could empower the changes in the later born generation (post-90s) far more than the other previous generations as the age gap between the two groups are relatively small that could underline the new findings solely within the post-90s generation rather than the conventional differences such as an aspect in terms of the age differences. Ultimately, this comparative analysis in both generations would illustrate whether or not the Hong Kong's post-90s generation is a main variable in Hong Kong's continuous political upheaval and if so, how and why.

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<sup>48</sup> E. K. Tan. *Lack, loss and displacement: Renarrativizing "Chineseness" through the aesthetics of Southeast Asian literature and film*, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Press. 2007. p.12

## 4.1 Descriptive analysis

Anderson stressed on the profound role of the Print-capitalism that how the ground-breaking notion of nationalism came to birth which later united people to “imagine” as one nation and one community. In the settings of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this very print-capitalism has evolved and found a new channel in the age of rapid technological advance. No longer just the books and the newspapers, but also through various channels and platforms such as social media along with the foundational elements of the print-capitalism are the ubiquitously known bridging tools for the people today.

Given the significant role of the social media in Hong Kong’s recent political scene, the category of the ‘Print-capitalism’ category will be separately dealt alone in for the descriptive analysis section. To investigate how the Hong Kong’s post-90s as well as the post-80s have utilised the social media as a tool for the new acts of solidarity, in doing so, the 1:1 in-depth structured interview was carried out. By designing the author’s very own 1:1 in-depth structured interview, conducted a primary data via the field trip of 24-days-long to Hong Kong.

The target interviewees were both of the generations however, the desirable interviewees were the ones who are strongly opinionated and self-willing to take a part in the interview for rather sensitive political subject. In prior to the field trip to Hong Kong, author had compiled a list of fifteen young activists who have vigorously engaged in recent Hong Kong’s political scene. The listed target individuals for the interview included both post-90s and the post-80s. However, the prerequisites for the interviewee candidates were 1) either of the post-80s or the post-90s, 2) a permanent Hong Kong Identity card holder, 3) a current resident of Hong Kong and 4) consent for the academic use of survey information. In prospect of conducting a meaningful qualitative data, author has reached out to every one of fifteen individuals to single out for the interview. As a result, the interview with seven out of fifteen candidates went successfully and the



interview dialogues of the seven interviewees are found in the appendices.<sup>49</sup>

The personality of the interview was a 1:1 in-depth structured interview. However, depending on how the answers are, the supplementary questions were added under dash. For instance, the survey question nine (Q9.) asked to choose one or more ethnic identities best describe oneself, and for the Q9-1, the respondents were asked to elaborate for choosing the ethnic identity one has chosen. In this way, structured interview allows to ask the same all questions to all interviewees however, also could get an access to additional questions to know why and how one thinks as one answered.

An anonymisation was requested by a few number of the interviewees due to the sensitivity of this rather political topic. In doing so, the author has used the pseudonyms, and those wanted to remain anonymous were recorded under the fake names. Owed all to the volunteered as well as the willingly agreed to take part in the 1:1 in-depth interview participants, the author could have had an access to see the key insights of the mentality, mindset and motives behind the Hong Kong's future generations.

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<sup>49</sup> <Appendix 5> Field Trip (2016 1:1 Interview Dialogues, p.115-136

## 4.2 Regression analysis

Owed to Benedict Anderson for its original conceptualisation, Anderson's four building blocks –of which he argued as what constituted the nationalism– as a framework tool, this study aims to illustrate whether or not the Hong Kong's post-90s generation is a main variable in Hong Kong's continuous political upheaval and if so, how and why. In other words, whether or not Hong Kong's this very generation has the explanation power in explaining the Hong Kong being at the crossroads. Among the four academically fruitful categories of 'Print-capitalism', 'Print-language', 'Official Nationalism', and 'Last Wave', with the exception of the 'Print-capitalism' category (dealt under the 'Descriptive analysis') however, with two additional sociodemographic factors are classified into variables for the regression use as seen below in <Table 4-1>.

**<Table 4-1> Variable Classification**

<b>Dependent Variable (DV)</b>	'Official Nationalism'
<b>Independent Variables (IV)</b>	'Print-language' and 'Last Wave'
<b>Independent Variables (IV) &amp; Control Variables (CV)</b>	'Birth Year' and 'Gender'

Rooted from the very goal of this research, this paper aims to capture the characteristics of the generation of post-90s thus the birth year will be used as a main variable whilst also as a control variable to find if one's age (generation) contributes to Hong Kong's "Imagined Communities". In the case of 'Gender', as an interesting sociodemographic factor which could play a significant role in shaping a political view, will be used both as a main and control variable as well.

**<Table 4-2> Variables of ‘Official Nationalism’**

Variables	Definitions
Pride in HKSAR Government and the System ( <i>pride</i> )	This variable shows whether or not a respondent has a pride in the HKSAR government. It is aimed to demonstrate Hong Kong’s post-80s and the post-90s generations’ confidence in its regime-in-practice. In the survey, respondents were given an agree-disagree statement asking, “Overall, how do you evaluate the HKSAR government and its system.” <sup>50</sup>
Disloyalty to HKSAR Government and the System ( <i>disloyalty</i> )	This variable shows whether or not respondent is disloyal to the HKSAR government. It is aimed to demonstrate whether Hong Kong’s post-80s and the post-90s generations support for the regime-in-practice. In the survey, respondents were given an agree-disagree statement asking, “I think the HKSAR government and it system should be revised and have amendments accordingly.” <sup>51</sup>
Absolute Preference on Democracy ( <i>dem_pref</i> )	This variable shows whether or not respondent has an absolute preference on democracy. It is aimed to demonstrate a strong support for democracy, which ultimately measures the very distance of Hong Kong people from the mainland government, namely the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the survey, respondents were given an agree-disagree statement asking, “Democracy is always preferable to any other form of government.” <sup>52</sup>
Democracy as the Best Form of Government ( <i>loophole</i> )	This variable shows whether or not respondent persistently chooses democracy as the best form of government whilst admitting the deficiencies may lie the very system. In this rather radical statement, this variable is to capture the respondents’ opinion on democracy to a higher perhaps the highest degree. In the survey, respondents were given an agree-disagree statement asking, “Despite its loopholes, Democracy still is the best form of government.” <sup>53</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Asian Barometer, “Asian Barometer Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development”, Section J: Regime Preference, q.81, p.9, “Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government”.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., Section J: Regime Preference, q.83, p.10, “I would rather live under our system of government than any other than I can think of”.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., Section P: Democratic Legitimacy and Preference for democracy, q.124, p.17, “Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government”.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., Section P: Democratic Legitimacy and Preference for democracy, q.128, p.18, “Democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best form of government”.

Circumstantial Preference on Authoritarianism ( <i>authori</i> )	This variable shows whether or not respondent yet has any ties to the authoritarianism. This captures if there is a social consensus that democracy is the “only game in town” <sup>54</sup> amongst post-80 as well as post-90s of Hong Kong. In the survey, respondents were given an agree-disagree statement asking, “Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one.” <sup>55</sup>
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Portrayed by the <Table 4-2>, the ‘Official Nationalism’ (dependent variable) consists of five variables, ‘Pride in HKSAR Government and the System’, ‘Disloyalty to HKSAR Government and the System’, ‘Absolute Preference on Democracy’, ‘Democracy as the Best Form of Government’ and ‘Circumstantial Preference on Authoritarianism’. As the category of ‘Official Nationalism’ is classified as a dependent variable hence all five variables that fall under the category will be used as dependent variables.

As an aid in structuring the author’s own research design, amongst the core questionnaires from the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), five questions in the sections regarding evaluation on the regime-in-practice and the preference on democracy were selected then modified. The five questions were given in binary scales by an agree-disagree statement.

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<sup>54</sup> Linz and Stepan. *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1996. p.5

<sup>55</sup> Asian Barometer, “Asian Barometer Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development”, Section P: Democratic Legitimacy and Preference for democracy, q.124, p.17, “Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one”.

**<Table 4-3> Variables of Other Categories**

Categories	Variables	Definitions
<b>Print-language</b> <sup>56</sup>	Level of English ( <i>eng_lv</i> )	This variable indicates the linguistic proficiency in English. The scale was given from 1 to 4: 1) Basic, 2) Intermediate, 3) Quite fluent, and 4) Native.
	Level of Mandarin ( <i>man_lv</i> )	This variable indicates the linguistic proficiency in Mandarin. The scale was given from 1 to 4: 1) Basic, 2) Intermediate, 3) Quite fluent, and 4) Native.
	Level of other Foreign Language ( <i>oth_for_lv</i> )	This variable indicates the linguistic proficiency in foreign language other than either of English or Mandarin, only if they spoke in one. The scale was given from 1 to 4: 1) Basic, 2) Intermediate, 3) Quite fluent, and 4) Native.
	Speaking Native Cantonese as a Non-Prerequisite to be Hongkonger ( <i>hk</i> )	This variable indicates the necessary fluency level in Cantonese for one to claim as a Hongkonger. Respondents were asked to choose within the given scale of 1 to 4, with 1 indicating ‘Very important’ and 4 for ‘Not important.’
	Difference between Cantonese in Hong Kong and Guangdong ( <i>canto_same</i> )	This variable indicates the differences lie between spoken Cantonese in Hong Kong and Guangdong province (Mainland China). Respondents were asked to choose between the scale of 1 to 4, with 1 indicating ‘Absolutely same’ and 4 indicating ‘Not same at all.’
<b>Last Wave</b> <sup>57</sup>	Self-perception on Ethnicity ( <i>des_hk</i> , <i>des_hk_in_ch</i> , <i>des_ch</i> , <i>des_ch_in_hk</i> , <i>des_gbr</i> <i>des_can</i> <sup>58</sup> )	This variable indicates one’s self-perception on her/his ethnicity. Given the following options, respondents were asked to choose one ethnicity best described her/himself: 1) Hongkonger, 2) Hongkonger in China, 3) Chinese, 4) Chinese in Hong Kong, 5) Asian, 6) British, and 7) Others (please specify: _____).

<sup>56</sup> Note: The linguistic proficiency level of Cantonese was also surveyed. However, as all respondents of 218 have answered to 4 (Native) hence the very variable could not be used in the regression.

<sup>57</sup> Note: The respondent answered for “Asian” was reported to be only 1 hence could not be tested.

<sup>58</sup> Note: The variable, *des\_can* represents Canadian.

	Issued countries of passports <sup>59</sup> ( <i>pas_hk</i> , <i>pas_bri</i> , <i>pas_can</i> )	This variable indicates the issued countries of the currently held passports. Respondent was given with options of 1) HKSAR passport, 2) British National Overseas Passport, 3) British Passport (permanent), 4) Taiwanese passport – Republic of China–, 5) Canadian Passport, and 6) Others (please specify: _____).
<b>Others</b>	Year of birth ( <i>birthyear</i> )	This variable indicates the year of birth, which classifies the generation one belongs to. Respondent was asked to choose between the given ranges: 1980 to 1989 for the post-80s and year 1990 to 1999 for the post-90s generation.
	Gender dummy ( <i>male</i> )	This variable indicates the gender of respondent. It was created as dummy variable thus if a respondent is a male then the variable is 1.

Proceeding next to the independent variables, the <Table 4-3> above portrays the model specification of independent variables –alternatively, also known as the explanatory variables– under the categories of ‘Print-language’ and ‘Last wave’ and the other variables (sociodemographic factors). To fathom the role of the ‘Print-language’ as wholly, the official languages of Hong Kong which are Chinese and English as well as the common tongue, the Cantonese are all included. Along with the ‘self-perception on ethnicity’ of which Anderson has argued as the nationalism the periphery once learned and imitated from the Metropole, the ‘issued countries of passports’ as another widely known British legacy from the colonial era, was also added to the category of the ‘Last Wave’.

Whilst the target population being the post-90s as well as the post-80s generation, given the demographics of the Hong Kong population amongst the post-90s and the post-

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<sup>59</sup> Note: Taiwanese Passports, along with other countries was also given as an option, however only 1 respondent has answered to be currently holding, hence excluded from the independent variables.

80s are 1,844,132 (Census & Statistics Department, HKSAR, 2011)<sup>60</sup> out of Hong Kong's total population being 7.2 million (World Bank, 2014)<sup>61</sup>, the desirable sample size by the sample size calculation was approximately three-hundred people. However, the total number of respondents for the survey resulted in 218 people; 109 for each generation.

Every questions in the survey questionnaires, the respondents were given the liberty of 'refuse to answer'. However, with an exception to the birth year to capture the generation, which is the ultimate purpose of this study. The question one (Q1) asks of the respondents' year of birth and the range from 1980 to 1999 was given. From 1980 to 1989 is the post-80s generation (which in Chinese would be 八零後 or 80后) and the remain of 1990 to 1999 is the post-90s generation (九零後 or 90后). The survey respondents of whom were reported to be neither of the post-90s nor the post-80s were disregarded. Furthermore, not all survey questionnaire result was used for the regression, but only applied the ones who met the requirements. The prerequisites for the survey was 1) either of the post-80s or the post-90s, 2) a permanent Hong Kong Identity card holder, 3) a current resident of Hong Kong and 4) consent for the academic use of this survey information.

Only the information of those who have agreed to all of the three prerequisites were used for the empirical data. To fathom the conducted result, have used software Stata 2015 for generating the result in the regression analysis. In terms of the sample selection issue, a convenience sampling (a non-random sampling) was employed in numerous venues across Hong Kong including Hong Kong island, Kowloon, New territories such as Tsim Sha Tsui metro station, Mongkok metro station, HKU (University of Hong Kong) metro station, Tai Po Market metro station and etc.

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<sup>60</sup> Census Department, HKSAR. "Hong Kong Population by Age Group and Sex 2011"

<sup>61</sup> World Bank, "Data - Hong Kong SAR, China"

As a result, this regression analysis aims to manifest the correlations of the three categories as well as the sociodemographic factors, this ultimately will capture whether or not the birth year –which speaks of the age and generation– could be the explanation power for the Hong Kong’s reaction to the official nationalism; China’s rhetorical ‘One China’ policy. By visiting the correlation of each categorical variable via regression, we will be able to illuminate how the characteristics of the post-90s generation of Hong Kong’s in the tools of the “imagined communities” and touch upon the implications of the findings in terms of the future of Hong Kong and the future trajectory of China-Hong Kong relations.



### 4.3 Reflection & Revisitation on Methodology

As aforementioned above, given the subject of this research is aimed at focusing on a country-specific, which is Hong Kong (of People's Republic China) to be precise, thus in-depth analysis on a single case study has allowed room for comprehensive research methods thus adopted the mixed methods. Meanwhile for the descriptive analysis, overall procedures went as the author has planned before the field trip, on the other hand, for the regression analysis, has undergone overcoming many difficulties in terms of raw data retrieving as well as the selecting the target samples for the survey questionnaire.

In the initial stage of exploring for research methods, the author was keen to utilise the credible source from the Public Opinion Programme at the University of Hong Kong (HKUPOP) as a secondary data for the regression analysis. Established in the year of 1997, a month before the handover, the very institution as a research centre (unit under the Social Sciences Department at the University of Hong Kong), with vast agendas of which includes territory's social, political, civil, national concerns have been highly regarded across the numerous fields and professions such as policy makers, professors and researchers.<sup>62</sup>

Besides the outstandingly well-coordinated statistics provided by the HKUPOP, the very institution is also well known for its excellent compilation of demographic profile of the survey respondents'. However, regrettably a separate dataset of each generation was not listed in the demographic profile of the respondents, in other words, a separate dataset of post-90s generation which is the crucially needed core information for this very research was not available. Moreover, despite the numerous dialogues of several-months-long under mutual cooperation with the HKUPOP, most of the requested agendas meant excessively large-scale of the raw data, having faced with various

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<sup>62</sup> HKUPOP. "About POP"

material hurdles eventually resulted in failure of secondary data retrieving. However, an overview of the HKUPOP's statistics of long years since its establishment in 1997 on vast agendas and it immensely helped in providing a big picture of how Hong Kong has evolved to where she stands today.

#### 4.3.1 Shortcomings of Methodology

Though secondary data from a renowned institution would have been preferable, as a second best option, for the empirical research, author has taken a field trip to conduct the primary data. Nonetheless, conducting the author's very own primary data leaves a few concerns in domain. In terms of the samples, unlike the simple random sampling, the convenience sampling does not guarantee of the representativeness for the chosen samples as it is a non-probability method. This sampling selection issue automatically raises the concerns for the data outcome, as the very method of sample selection could raise a question of the response bias. Additionally, though the author has tried to collect the many samples as possible from the various regions across Hong Kong, however though the sample size does meet the minimum sample size but it is rather inadequate to draw a convincing argument.

Nonetheless, considering the shortcomings of this study, the author has tried to fill in the lacking. The very effort has particularly been put into three main parts: 1) analytical framework and 2) regression analysis model. In doing so, firstly, to serve the best purpose of this study, in the initial stage of the research, the author considered of an analytical framework modification.<sup>63</sup> By developing the original framework by Anderson, the author tried to develop a few modified models that could ideally fit into today's case of Hong Kong. However, all for the best, resulted in using the original

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<sup>63</sup> <Appendix 3> Analytical Framework Modification, p.109

framework. Secondly, the author has generated a several regression models to portray the most out of the data outcome. Amongst a few models generated in the early procedure of the regression work, one of the alternative regression model is found in the appendices section.<sup>64</sup> Due to high collinearity however, regrettably, many models were inevitable to avoid the data distortion. As a result, of several models, the model which satisfied statistically the most was chosen.

Whilst the most of main interests by numerous fields such as economists of business sector lie on the consumption patterns of the up-and-coming generations (this not confined to Hong Kong alone but could be stretched to greater China region), nonetheless, this study focuses on the newly emerged generation, so-called *jiǔ ling hou* generation, however not in the economic aspects but rather political and the environmental and the societal settings they are placed on. Admittedly, many flaws of this study may have been found, however in all modesty, asking the readers to take this bold yet modest attempt with generosity. The unique yet ubiquitous concept of this “imagined communities” by the Benedict Anderson, the author ambitiously has tried to tackle the Hong Kong’s long-enduring question, the Hong Kong identity. With utmost sincerity and humble hope, wishes this very study of Hong Kong’s post-90s generation could set a new paradigm for the upcoming research on this generation livelier.

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<sup>64</sup> <Appendix 4> Alternative Regression Analysis Model, p.110

## Chapter 5. Hong Kong Analysis

### 5.1 Descriptive Analysis of Hong Kong's "Imagined Communities"

Throughout the territory's continuous political upheaval, top media publications paid an eye-catching attention to the role of social media. Of numerous publications, to name a few of notable publications, The Guardian called this as the "Social Media Revolution" and went even further and said "Hong Kong protests bring crisis of confidence for traditional media"<sup>65</sup>. Owing to the development in technology, we enjoy a global network of online support, and without any exceptions, Hong Kong was also a beneficiary. It received a global solidarity across the continents such as the United States and the United Kingdom. The Hong Kong's English-language newspaper, South China Morning Post said the Hong Kong protest is "on the ground and around the world."<sup>66</sup> Similarly, The New Yorker said, "...in the social-media age, protests are no longer local"<sup>67</sup>. It is very apparent and clear that what has been going on in Hong Kong is watched by the eyes all over the world.

As aforementioned earlier, this young group has appeared to have engaged via the social network platform. This well appears in the domestic as well as the global solidarity we have seen through the media. If we look at the <Appendix 5>, the seven interviewees commonly picked tear gas for the reason why the Umbrella Movement has earned notorious fame that the. Shockingly, all have put an exceptional emphasis on democracy and democratic elements and also on the city of Hong Kong, Hongkongers and Hong

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<sup>65</sup> Guardian, "Hong Kong Protests Bring Crisis of Confidence for Traditional Media", 29<sup>th</sup> October 2014

<sup>66</sup> South China Morning Post, "The Role of Social Media in Occupy Protests, on the Ground and Around the World", 30<sup>th</sup> October 2014

<sup>67</sup> The New Yorker, "Hong Kong Media and the Hong Kong Protests", 1<sup>st</sup> October 2014

Kong values. This well portrays that the involvement of the young to the continuous protests in a row, similar personality of the protest.

## 5.2 Regression Analysis of Hong Kong's "Imagined Communities"

In this section, by employing the analytical framework conceptualised by Benedict Anderson –the four building blocks of origin and the spread of nationalism in the 18<sup>th</sup> century–, the regression analysis based on the academically fruitful categories will be illustrated. The outcome of regression will feature the estimation of the likelihood between the independent variables under the two categories of 'Print-language' and the 'Last wave'<sup>68</sup>, and the five dependent variables under the 'Official Nationalism' category.

Focusing on a single country case study allowed a room for the mixed methods. Meanwhile if the descriptive analysis tackled 'why and how are post-90s generation different from the post-80s generation?', the regression analysis under this section desires to tap into the correlation between the variables and see if there is the explanation power by the birthyear (which speaks of age/generation).

On top of the ultimate aim of this study which is to illustrate the power of *birthyear* to analyse the characteristics of the Hong Kong's post-90s generation in its nationalism, to see if there is any meaningful correlation in terms of the sociodemographic factors to draw, along with the birthyear –of which indicates the age and generation–, the gender(*male* dummy) both as a main variable and the control variable will be employed to portray the correlations with the dependent variable (official nationalism) amongst the other independent variables however, also the sole power of the generation and gender.

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<sup>68</sup> Note: The independent variables under the category of 'Language' are *eng\_lv*, *man\_lv*, and *oth\_for\_lv* which are for the linguistic proficiency level in English, Mandarin and other foreign language –other than English or Mandarin– respectively. As for the category of 'Ethnicity', the independent variables are *des\_hk*, *des\_ch*, *des\_hk\_in\_ch*, *des\_ch\_in\_hk* and *des\_gbr* for HongKonger, Chinese, HongKonger in China, Chinese in Hong Kong and British respectively.

### 5.2.1 Regression on Official Nationalism, Print-language and Last Wave(1)

**<Table 5-1> Sources of Pride in HKSAR Government & System**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable (1) - Pride in HKSAR Government & System									
birthyear	-0.063** (-2.534)			-0.115 (-1.447)		-0.095 (-1.379)		-0.032 (-0.347)		-0.040 (-0.487)
male		0.412 (1.593)		0.485* (1.796)		0.439* (1.649)		0.419 (1.552)		0.465* (1.742)
eng_lv			0.194 (0.584)	-0.051 (-0.124)						
man_lv			0.074 (0.219)	-0.282 (-0.674)						
oth_for_lv			0.093 (0.549)	-0.056 (-0.268)						
hk					-0.039 (-0.093)	-0.256 (-0.584)				
canto_same					-0.298 (-1.193)	0.015 (0.045)				
des_hk							-0.457 (-0.879)	-0.267 (-0.261)		
des_hk_in_ch							0.382 (0.653)	0.219 (0.370)		
des_ch†							0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)		
des_ch_in_hk							-0.096 (-0.155)	-0.142 (-0.227)		
pas_bri									0.548** (2.104)	0.177 (0.209)
pas_can††									0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
N	218	218	218	218	218	218	215	215	200	200
pseudo R-sq	0.050	0.019	0.039	0.077	0.038	0.075	0.056	0.075	0.036	0.061

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.

Constant is not reported.

z statistics in parentheses.

†, †† All respondents of the group answered same to the question hence excluded from the regression.

The regression results in the <Table 5-1> shows the likelihood between the independent variables under the two categories of ‘Print-language’ and the ‘Last wave’, and the first dependent variable of ‘Official Nationalism’ category, the ‘Pride in the HKSAR Government & System’ (*pride*). To start with an independent variable from the top, regarding the matter of generation, as shown, the *birthyear* appears to be negatively correlated with the pride issue and significant in 5% level. In other words, the later you are born, less likely to have pride in the HKSAR government and its system. However, though the variable is highly significant, due to the low pseudo R square values, the mechanisms behind one’s pride in the HKSAR government and its system hinders the sole explanation by the generation per se.

Moreover, though the significance in a few variables such as *pas\_bri* are found other variables under category of ‘Print-language’ and the ‘Last wave’ have also appeared to be rather inadequate for the explanation regarding the mechanisms for the pride. Yet again, the pseudo R square values still remain low whilst there are only few variables revealed to be significant. The reason behind this weakness of variables could be understood by the fact of the majority of respondents’ pride in the HKSAR government and its system. More than 90% (197/218) of respondents have answered that they were proud of their incumbents in authority roles as well as the structure. Consequently, this hinders the variables used in the survey from explaining the very process of one arriving at having a “pride” towards the HKSAR government and its system. All in all, for <Table 1>, a meaningful data could not be illustrated due to the extremely low pseudo R Square values even with the high significance found in certain variables.



## 5.2.2 Regression on Official Nationalism, Print-language and Last Wave(2)

**<Table 5-2> Sources of Disloyalty to HKSAR Government & System**

Independent Variables		Dependent Variable (2) - Disloyalty to the HKSAR Government & System									
birthyear	0.280*** (9.967)		0.172** (2.441)		0.213*** (3.111)		0.062 (0.905)		0.186*** (3.031)		
male	0.074 (0.423)		-0.281 (-1.025)		-0.345 (-1.291)		-0.224 (-0.753)		-0.338 (-1.253)		
eng_lv		-0.625** (-2.368)	-0.178 (-0.545)								
man_lv		-1.737*** (-5.098)	-1.133*** (-2.678)								
oth_for_lv		-0.125 (-0.922)	0.035 (0.220)								
hk				-0.398 (-1.132)	0.132 (0.333)						
canto_same				1.170*** (5.226)	0.486 (1.371)						
des_hk						2.169*** (5.018)	1.673** (2.125)				
des_hk_in_ch						-1.173*** (-3.053)	-1.099*** (-2.771)				
des_ch†						0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)				
des_ch_in_hk						-0.911** (-2.058)	-0.871* (-1.956)				
pas_bri								-2.810*** (-10.214)	-1.247** (-2.026)		
pas_can								-2.380*** (-6.157)	-0.712 (-1.020)		
N	218	218	218	218	218	218	215	215	218	218	
pseudo R-sq	0.566	0.001	0.574	0.597	0.532	0.578	0.633	0.637	0.558	0.604	

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.

Constant is not reported.

z statistics in parentheses.

† All respondents of the group answered same to the question hence excluded from the regression.

Unlike the previous regression, with the overall promising pseudo R Square values except for the regression with male dummy, the <Table 2> portrays the high significance in numerous coefficients of the variables. Firstly, as shown there is a positive correlation between the *birthyear* and the disloyalty to the HKSAR government and its system. To elaborate, amongst the survey sample of Hong Kong's post-80s and the post-90s generation, the later born are more likely to be disloyal to the HKSAR government and its system. Given the 1% of statistical significance, we could tell, the post-90s generation in relative to the post-80s is more of a reformist towards their government and the system<sup>69</sup>. However, the *male* alone has turned out to be insignificant similarly to the <Table 1>. Moreover, as mentioned, the exceptionally low pseudo R Square value of *male*, the very variable of all variables remains weak in the explanation of correlation with *disloyalty*.

In terms of the variables under the category of 'Print-language', there are three factors, which are linguistic proficiency levels in English, Mandarin and Other Foreign Language –other than English or Mandarin– (*eng\_lv*, *man\_lv*, and *oth\_for\_lv*), speaking native Cantonese as a non-prerequisite to be a Hongkonger (*hk*) and the difference between Cantonese in Hong Kong and Guangdong (*canto\_same*). Firstly, in regard to the linguistic proficiency level, the respondents attained with high proficiency level in English as well as Mandarin have appeared to be significantly loyal towards the HKSAR government and its system. However, applied with the *birthyear* and *male* as control variables, English level variable lost the significance whilst for the Mandarin level did stay still with the 1% of its significance, and this demonstrates the robustness of the

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<sup>69</sup> Note: The survey respondents were given with agree-disagree statement, "I think the HKSAR government and its system should be revised and have amendments accordingly." By agreeing to the given statement, the post-90s generation compared to the post-80s shows the will to reform.

Mandarin level. Also, as *birthyear* as a control variable appears to be significant in the 5% level, this very variable proves much to be valid. That is to say, the linguistic proficiency level cannot explain the mechanisms of the loyalty issue wholly. The outcome as such is noteworthy given the high level of collinearity between the *birthyear* and the language level variables since the correlation between the two is 0.8, 0.7 and -0.89, respectively.

Second and thirdly, the variable associated with the speaking native Cantonese as a non-prerequisite to be a Hongkonger (*hk*) and the difference between Cantonese in Hong Kong and Guangdong (*canto\_same*), the respondents who believe that speaking native Cantonese is a non-prerequisite to self-claim as a Hongkonger, are reported to be loyal to the HKSAR government and its system, though it is statistically insignificant. The group who shares a view of ‘speaking native Cantonese as a non-prerequisite to be a Hongkonger could be described as linguistically and also perhaps ethnically liberal as one doesn’t strongly request of native level in Cantonese for one to claim as a Hongkonger. Similarly, in the context of group of respondents who believe there is a difference between spoken Cantonese in Hong Kong and Guangdong province could be seen as Hongkongers underlining its distinctiveness and uniqueness for Hong Kong and its people.

Having this said, we could summarise that among the post-80s and the post-90s, the linguistically liberal were loyal to the government and the given political system whilst on the other hand, the linguistically illiberal whom are expected to be embedded with the Hongkongness meaning, proud of the uniqueness of Hong Kong, its people and values were disloyal to the government and the system and called for a reform. Even so, the significance of the *canto\_same* was removed, and only the *birthyear* shined with the 5% of significance. To conclude, whether or not one thinks ‘All Hongkongers should speak Cantonese to a native level’ or believes ‘Cantonese in Hongkong and Guangdong is different’, the variable of *birthyear*, which associates with the generation is a far more

determining variable for reaching to a political evaluation such as being loyal to the government and a system.

For the variables associated in the category of ‘Last wave’, there are two group of indicators, which are self-perception on ethnicity and the issued countries of the currently holding passports. Firstly, in terms of the self-perception on ethnicity, the self-described as ‘Hongkonger’ were significantly disloyal to the government and the system. This alternatively could be said that so-called ‘Hongkongers are disloyal and support for Hong Kong’s political reform. The ‘Hongkongers in China’ were also highly significant however on contrary to ‘Hongkongers’, disagreed with the statement, “I think HKSAR government and its system should be revised and have amendments accordingly”. Also, the respondents of whom self-described as ‘Chinese in Hong Kong’ were appeared to be loyal toward the government and the system, however with no significance.

In a nutshell, we could see both of these two groups are corresponding to each other that they both are loyalists who are much fond of the authority and the political structure. The very stance of these groups of ‘Hongkongers in China’ and ‘Chinese in Hongkong’ are on the opposite of the Hongkongers, the reformists and the revisionists. Notably, the *birthyear* as a control variable did not outstand and this is due to the robustness of the variables regarding the self-perception on ethnicity despite a fall in the significance. Therefore, we could say, even under the control variables, as the robustness in the variables regarding the self-perception on ethnicity are found, these could be the determinants in whether or not loyal to Hong Kong’s government and its system.

Lastly, in terms of the passport holders, the British passport holders along with the Canadian passport holders significantly believed in no need of the revisions or amendments in neither of the government nor the system. After the application of the two control variables, the Canadian passport holder have lost the entire significance, while the coefficient of British passport holders maintained its significance in 5% level.

Again, the *birthyear* repeatedly appears to be highly significant hence in explaining how one arrives to whether or not loyal to the HKSAR government and its system, much attention should be paid to not only the issued countries of the passports but also the *birthyear* which implicitly represents of the generation.

### 5.2.3 Regression on Official Nationalism, Print-language and Last Wave(3)

**<Table 5-3> Sources of Absolute Preference on Democracy**

Independent Variables		Dependent Variable (3) - Absolute Preference on Democracy							
birthyear	0.227*** (9.785)		0.252*** (3.892)		0.264*** (4.188)		0.089 (1.312)		0.138** (2.324)
male	0.065 (0.369)		-0.198 (-0.858)		-0.181 (-0.780)		-0.112 (-0.456)		-0.234 (-1.019)
eng_lv		-0.424* (-1.873)	0.294 (1.013)						
man_lv		-0.877*** (-3.311)	-0.073 (-0.218)						
oth_for_lv		-0.241** (-2.080)	-0.030 (-0.228)						
hk				0.386 (1.172)	1.057*** (2.640)				
canto_same				1.276*** (6.052)	0.430 (1.308)				
des_hk						1.162*** (2.995)	0.339 (0.439)		
des_hk_in_ch						-1.537*** (-3.980)	-1.509*** (-3.782)		
des_ch						-0.861 (-1.051)	-0.790 (-0.953)		
des_ch_in_hk						-1.272*** (-2.891)	-1.254*** (-2.815)		
pas_bri								-2.293*** (-9.651)	-1.050* (-1.748)
pas_can								-2.110*** (-5.762)	-0.812 (-1.192)
N	218	218	218	218	218	218	218	218	218
pseudo R-sq	0.437	0.000	0.388	0.445	0.391	0.465	0.503	0.510	0.459

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.  
Constant is not reported.  
z statistics in parentheses.

Throughout the regression tables of the previous two, we have witnessed the crucial role of the *birthyear*; in other words, the role of generation on the political awareness. Again, in the <Table 3>, the very variable as a main variable appears to be outstandingly significant whilst featuring the positive correlation. On the other hand, the *male* alone is at a standstill, neither demonstrates the significance nor the pseudo R Square value, the latter of which is very near from 0.

In terms of the variables of ‘Common Language’, which are language proficiency level in English, Mandarin and the other foreign language, the all three appear to be negatively correlated with the absolute preference on democracy. Nonetheless, as shown in the 4<sup>th</sup> column, these all of language variables have lost significance under the control variables regarding the generation and gender. In short, whilst one’s linguistic ability and its level could be an element in shaping one’s national consciousness<sup>70</sup> however, as the regression shows, with the significance in 1% level, the *birthyear* variable is more of a profound variable in the formation of one’s absolute preference on democracy, rather than one’s linguistic proficiency level per se.

Under the same category, when *hk* and *canto\_same* were utilised in regression analysis without the control variables, only *canto\_same* appeared to be significant. However, in the presence of the two control variables, only *hk* holds high significance. This result tells us that, despite the sufficiently high significance in each column, those variables are hard to be described as robust ones. Yet again, the *birthyear* as a control variable outstands and proves its significant role in its relation to the absolute preference on democracy,

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<sup>70</sup> Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso. 1983. p.24

For the case of self-perception on ethnicity, which falls under the ‘Last wave’ category, the respondents who have self-described as ‘Hongkonger’, appear to have accepted democracy as the most preferable compared to other form of government. In contrast, the ‘Hongkonger in China’ and ‘Chinese in Hong Kong’ appear to have answered exactly the opposite; democracy is not always preferable than other form of government. In the absence of three respondents answered as ‘Chinese’ due to the same response of all three respondents, of all three self-perception ethnic groups hold 1% of statistical significance. Such high significance remains the same even under the control variables, except for the decrease in the significance for the ‘Hongkonger’ group. Given the control variables in effect, the persistent 1% significance of the ‘Hongkonger in China’ and ‘Chinese in Hong Kong’ group implies the robustness in the coefficients of the two. As seen from the previous table in the <Table 2>, the *birthyear* as a control variable did not outstand in this table again. To summarise, rather than the which year you may have born or alternatively the generation you are in, the self-perception on one’s ethnicity plays a bigger role in the mechanisms behind one’s a political awareness building such as seeing democracy as always preferable to any other form of government.

Admittedly, neither of two control variables of *birthyear* nor *male* have appeared to be significant. To clarify this, if we look into the very composition of the self-perception on ethnicity, as we could see from the <Table 3-1> below, out of 218 total respondents (of 109 per generation), the 98% (107/109) of the post-90s generation has answered to be self-perceiving themselves as Hongkongers, while only 1 respondent of 109 respondents of post-80s generation has claimed. Moreover, on contrary to the post-90s, the 61% (66/109) of the post-80s generation that is the majority within the group has chosen ‘Honkonger in China’ followed by the ‘Chinese in Hong Kong’ for 23% (25/109) and British for 8.3% (9/109) and etc.



**<Table 5-3-1> Composition of ‘Self-perception on Ethnicity’**

	<b>Post-80s</b>	<b>Post-90s</b>
<b>Hongkonger</b>	1	107
<b>Chinese</b>	3	0
<b>Hongkonger in China</b>	66	1
<b>Chinese in Hong Kong</b>	25	0
<b>Asian</b>	1	0
<b>British</b>	9	1
<b>Canadian</b>	4	0
<b>Grand Total</b>	109	109

It is apparent that almost all of post-90s generation shares a view in self-perceiving as Hongkongers, meanwhile conflictingly, the post-80s seems dispersed into seven different ethnic groups. Such outcome aids to explain the amplified use of the emphasis on the Hongkongness and the Hong Kong values by the many students and the young generation in Hong Kong’s recent conflicts. To sum, due the robustness of the ‘Hongkongers in China’ as well as ‘Chinese in Hong Kong’, the two control variables may have been shadowed under however as we could see from the <Table3-1>, what consists of Hongkongers are the post-90s generation hence we could conclude that this group of generation supports and prefers democracy than any other form of government.

In the case of the issued countries of the passport, respondents with both British passport (permanent) appear to not prefer democracy than other form of government, and this was also found the same for the Canadian passport holders. For the outcomes in terms of the issued countries of the passport, we should bear in mind that the result is based on the comparisons with the HKSAR passport holders, therefore could summarise that these two European passport holders are less fond of democracy than the HKSAR passport holders.

## 5.2.4 Regression on Official Nationalism, Print-language and Last Wave(4)

**<Table 5-4> Sources of Democracy as the Best Form of Government**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable (4) - Democracy as the Best Form of Government (loopholes)									
birthyear	0.103*** (5.572)		0.132** (2.379)		0.119** (2.230)		0.084 (1.425)		0.103* (1.890)	
male		0.202 (1.130)		0.167 (0.857)		0.126 (0.646)		0.232 (1.156)		0.096 (0.502)
eng_lv			0.199 (0.918)	0.634** (2.296)						
man_lv			-0.660*** (-2.731)	-0.326 (-1.139)						
oth_for_lv			-0.205* (-1.719)	-0.069 (-0.514)						
hk					0.917*** (2.741)	1.169*** (3.296)				
canto_same					1.016*** (4.908)	0.580** (2.060)				
des_hk							-0.230 (-0.660)	-1.121 (-1.642)		
des_hk_in_ch							-1.597*** (-4.073)	-1.673*** (-4.151)		
des_ch†							0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)		
des_ch_in_hk							-1.428*** (-3.097)	-1.441*** (-3.102)		
pas_bri									-1.032*** (-5.167)	-0.040 (-0.073)
pas_can									-0.776** (-2.216)	0.265 (0.408)
N	218	218	218	218	218	218	215	215	218	218
pseudo R-sq	0.118	0.005	0.120	0.145	0.144	0.163	0.170	0.183	0.146	0.175

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.

Constant is not reported.

z statistics in parentheses.

† All respondents of the group answered same to the question hence excluded from the regression.

According to the <Table 4>, firstly, the *birthyear* has significantly appeared to be positively correlated, in other words, the later born were more likely to have agreed to the given statement, “Despite its loopholes, democracy still is the best form of government”. Regrettably, the *male* as a solo persists to be insignificant hence fails to provide a predominant political trait by a gender aspect.

The three variables associated with linguistic proficiency level under ‘Print-language’ category is shown by the negative direction of coefficient. The respondents with high proficiency level in Mandarin significantly believes with its embedded systematic loopholes democracy is not the best form of government. With lower significance, for the respondents with high level in other foreign language have also turned out to share the similar view. Conversely, the respondents with high proficiency level in English are reported to believe democracy is the best form of government despite of its systematic vulnerability though statistically insignificant.

Under the two control variables in effect, the significance of the variables in regard to Mandarin level and other foreign language level have disappeared, whilst interestingly the 5% significance of English level has made an appearance. Along with the significance in the *birthyear*, we could conclude that the linguistic proficiency level in language is not an end itself, but the *birthyear* as well as the high proficiency level in English with its expected Western background could form an opinion on seeing democracy as the best form of government whilst accepting that it has systematic deficiencies.

Under the same category, in terms of the variables associated with ‘speaking native Cantonese as a non-prerequisite to be a Hongkonger’ (*hk*) and difference between Cantonese in Hong Kong and Guangdong (*canto\_same*), both of each variable with significance in 1% level appeared to be positively correlated. Applied with the control variables, though there was a slight drop in the significance of the *canto\_same*, however

both remained to be significant and shows its robustness thus these two variables along with the *birthyear* as a control variable stay very much valid in explaining the acceptance on democracy as the best form of government despite its systematic deficiencies.

To elaborate, such outcome reports that both group of linguistically –and perhaps ethnically– liberal (former) and the illiberal (latter) regard democracy as the best form of government even if it may have systematic flaws. On top of the positive correlation between these two variables of *hk* and *canto\_same* with the ‘Absolute Preference on Democracy’ shown in <Table 3>, both group of linguistically liberal and illiberal have also turned out to be the supporters of the democracy even though it may have loopholes in the very system. This could be interpreted that the diffuse support for democracy is present as the one’s political view was not determined or conditioned by the degree of one’s emphasis on Cantonese. The support for democracy from the both groups could be owed to the long years of British heritage during the colonial era as many scholars share a view on the spread of the liberal democracy as the legacy of the old empire. Or possibly, could be a new trend in tendency amongst the younger generations in the territory by differentiating linguistic identity and the political identity.

In terms of the category under ‘Last wave’, the respondents who self-perceived as ‘Hongkongers in China’ and the ‘Chinese in Hong Kong’ with 1% of significance shown to have disagreed with the statement thus disregards democracy with its underlying loopholes as the best form of government. The similar scene is applied to the respondents self-perceived as ‘Hongkongers’ however insignificant. Applied with the two control variables, as the 1% of significance for both the ‘Hongkongers in China’ and the ‘Chinese in Hong Kong’ remain the same, witnessed the robustness of the two groups. Here, the *birthyear* doesn’t outstand along with the independent variables associated with the self-perception on ethnicity.<sup>71</sup> In short, regardless of ‘Hongkonger in China’ or

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<sup>71</sup> Note: Nonetheless, in terms of the ratio of those self-described as ‘Hongkonger’ according to the composition of the ‘Self-perception on Ethnicity’, the absolute majority was by the post-90s

‘Chinese in Hong Kong’, other than the group who sees solely as Hongkongers significantly disagree with the democracy as the best form of government.

In the case regarding the passport, the permanent British passport holders and the Canadian passport holders with 1% and the 5% level of significance respectively, accepted the democracy as the best form of government. However, such significance did not withstand the control variables whilst the significance was found for the *birthyear* in 10% level. Therefore, in explaining a construction of one’s political evaluation such as ‘democracy as the best form of government despite its latent loophole’ cannot be solely explained by the issued countries of the passports currently held, but advised to take *birthyear* into an equation as well to discover the real influences.

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generation at 99.1% (107/108) meanwhile only 1 out of 108 amongst the respondents from the post-80s generation.

### 5.2.5 Regression on Official Nationalism, Print-language and Last Wave(5)

**<Table 5-5> Sources of Democracy as the Best Form of Government**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable (5) - Circumstantial Preference on Authoritarianism									
birthyear	-0.241*** (-10.567)		-0.281*** (-4.191)		-0.300*** (-4.590)		-0.116* (-1.748)		-0.161*** (-2.675)	
male	0.081 (0.469)		0.569** (2.213)		0.601** (2.302)		0.553** (2.000)		0.622** (2.423)	
eng_lv		0.296 (1.284)	-0.482 (-1.599)							
man_lv		0.886*** (3.305)	0.008 (0.023)							
oth_for_lv		0.369*** (3.068)	0.157 (1.149)							
hk				-0.351 (-1.066)	-1.114*** (-2.777)					
canto_same				-1.315*** (-6.238)	-0.438 (-1.294)					
des_hk						-1.193*** (-3.194)	-0.319 (-0.424)			
des_hk_in_ch						1.597*** (4.073)	1.488*** (3.663)			
des_ch†						0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)			
des_ch_in_hk						1.658*** (3.382)	1.591*** (3.218)			
pas_bri								2.456*** (10.339)	1.127* (1.860)	
pas_can								2.153*** (5.790)	0.755 (1.088)	
N	218	218	218	218	218	218	215	215	218	218
pseudo R-sq	0.492	0.001	0.449	0.525	0.434	0.539	0.556	0.579	0.518	0.562

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.

Constant is not reported.

z statistics in parentheses.

† All respondents of the group answered same to the question hence excluded from the regression.

According to <Table 5-5>, the *birthyear* as a single variable with 1% significance has appeared to be negatively correlated, in other words, the later born have disagreed to the given statement, “Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one”. On the other end, unlike the sole significance of the *birthyear* variable, which has illustrated the profound role in explaining from the generation aspect, the *male* as a solo resiliently stays insignificant.

For those variables associated with the category of ‘Print-language’, the group of respondents attained with high proficiency level in Mandarin and the other foreign language significantly believed in the circumstantial preference on authoritarian government over the democratic one. The similar outcome is applied to the group of high proficiency level in English, however features no statistical significance. However, under the effects of the two control variables, the significance in 1% level for both of the variables were removed. Instead, the negative correlation with significance in 1% level for the *birthyear* and astonishingly, for the first time, significance in 5% level however the positive direction of the coefficient for the *male* was reported. Overall, it implies that rather than the linguistic proficiency in regardless of the language, the later born are likely to disagree with the authoritarian government even if needed due to the certain conditions whilst for the gender aspect, the male have circumstantial preference on authoritarian government over democratic one.

In terms of the variables associated with speaking native Cantonese as a non-prerequisite to be a Hongkonger (*hk*) and the difference between Cantonese in Hong Kong and Guangdong (*canto\_same*), both variables have appeared to disagree with the circumstantial preference on authoritarian government. In corresponding to the <Table 5-3> and the <Table 5-4>, both of *hk* and *canto\_same* are reported to have support for democracy by featuring its negative direction of coefficients. Whilst the *hk* wasn’t captured with any significance, the *canto\_same* demonstrated a significance in 1% level however, disappeared after the application of the two control variables. In fact, under the

effect of the control variables, the 1% significance for both *hk* and the *birthyear* were found, and 5% for the *male*. In short, the linguistically liberal (*hk*) though not robust and the later born –namely the post-90s– are positively whilst the *male* are negatively correlated with the circumstantial preference on authoritarian government over democratic one. Ultimately, these three could be the crucial elements in explaining the circumstantial preference on authoritarian government over democratic one.

The variables of category under ‘Last wave’, the group self-perceived as ‘Hongkonger’ significantly disagreed with the circumstantial preference on authoritarian government. Conversely, the ‘Hongkonger in China’ and ‘Chinese in Hong Kong’ did accept of authoritarian government over democratic government under certain circumstances. With control variables, the significance for the ‘Hongkonger’ has disappeared however, both of ‘Hongkonger in China’ and ‘Chinese in Hong Kong’ withstood by the 1% of significance and showed their robustness. Moreover, the *birthyear* and *male* also appear to be significant however positively correlated for the former and negatively correlated for the latter. To sum, ‘Hongkonger in China’ as well as ‘Chinese in Hong Kong’ and *male* tend to accept the authoritarian government under certain circumstances. Nonetheless, on contrary to these three, the younger generation is likely to disregard the circumstantial preference on authoritarian government.

In illustrating whether or not one has conditional acceptance on authoritarian government in terms of the current passports one holds, the permanent British passport holders as well as the Canadian passport holders are reported to have the conditional support and both appeared with significance in 1% level. *Park & Chung* (2002), argue Asia has nostalgic customs with the authoritarianism due to the most countries of the region’s familiar history of state-led development under the dictatorship.<sup>72</sup> Notwithstanding the democracy as an only game in town, author notes Asia doesn’t have

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<sup>72</sup> Park & Chang. *Democracy & Democratisation in East Asia*. 2002. p.12



diffuse support for democracy. At this point, *Larry Diamond*'s statement of "Democracy is not an end, but a continuous process" could give an alerting mindset to those in democratic nations however, doesn't loyally value the system.

Nevertheless, the significance found for the British passport holders have decreased from 1% to 10% when was entirely lost for the Canadian passport holders after the application of the two control variables. Again, the *birthyear* as well as the *male dummy* were 1% and 5% significant respectively. All in all, via <Table 5> we could see the remarkable role of the gender, and it is noteworthy to pinpoint that the male was reported to be more favourable of conditional support for the authoritarian government. Though the male dummy alone may not have been outstanding in the four previous regressions, it sure has played a major role in this section.

## Chapter 6. Conclusion

Throughout the five regression tables of the three categories, based on the three of four building blocks of the “Imagined Communities” theory by Anderson demonstrated a significant role of the *birthyear*. Besides, notably the variables regarding the self-perception on ethnicity also have played a vital role in explaining the political awareness on both of ‘official nationalism’ (dependent variable) with other categories (independent variables).

To conclude, we could say that the independent variables alone (with no control variables applied) under ‘Print-language’ and ‘Last wave’ were reported to be valid in explaining the correlations to the political awareness on both of real and ideal ‘official nationalism’ (dependent variable), however most of them have lost the significance after the application of the control variables; except for the variables associated with the self-perception on ethnicity. In terms of the gender aspect, for the entire four regressions (from Table 5-1 to 5-4), it did not stand out, however the in the <Table 5-5> contributed a gender aspect in explaining the Hong Kong’s post-90s as well as the post-80s generation’s evaluation on HKSAR government and CCP (real) and on the notion of democracy (ideal) under the Anderson’s model.

The findings from the regression analysis indeed shows a great worrisome for the future trajectory between the Hong Kong and the Mainland China, which could also bring repercussion to Taiwan and China relations regarding the foreseeable reunification. The *birthyear*, a variable of which indicates an age and also a generation was positively correlated with the dependent variables regarding supporting democracy (under Real & Ideal category) whilst featured negative correlation with the HKSAR government. To interpret this, from the author’s findings, Hong Kong’s post-90s generation in relative to post-80s are more likely to be supportive of democracy whilst having no pride or loyalty to their own government. Moreover, democratic support doesn’t simply mean a mere

regime preference for Hongkongers, given PRC is a socialist system –though it does allow herself with number of capitalist elements–, the more support Hongkongers have for democracy, the further away it is from the motherland, People’s Republic of China.

Further research on the political culture of the Hong Kong’s post-90s generation could guide towards the potentials and predicaments in the territory’s fast-changing civic arenas, and harmony which Beijing hopes in the Chinese dream, and ultimately the future trajectory between the Hong Kong, China, Taiwan relations.

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## **Appendices**

### **<Appendix 1> Structured Interview (blank sheet)**

#### **Field Trip (2016) 1:1 Interview**

Date: OOO  
Venue: OOO

**Interviewee: OOO**  
**Generation: OOO**

- Q1. What is the year of your birth?
- Q2. What is your gender?
- Q3. How many passports do you currently hold?
- Q4. Could you please specify the countries of the issued passports you currently hold?
- Q5. Please rate your language proficiency in Cantonese
- Q6. Please rate your language proficiency in English
- Q7. Please rate your language proficiency in Mandarin
- Q8. Is there any other foreign language or provincial dialect you speak?
- Q9. Please choose one or more ethnic identities best describe yourself.
- Q10. For one to claim her/himself as a Hongkonger, does one's capability in speaking Cantonese to a native level important?



Q11. Do you agree Cantonese spoken in Hong Kong and elsewhere such as Guangdong Province are the same?

Q12. Are you a member of any kind of activist group/interest group/civil organisation?

Q13. Have you ever participated in any kind of demonstration/protest/rally in Hong Kong?

Q14. Amongst numerous movements/protests/demonstrations in Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement 2014 received the worldwide coverage. Why do you think this has whilst the others were relatively less known?

Q15. Have you or your group have taken any part of solidarity with any Hong Kong or overseas based activist group/interest group/organization for a similar cause?

Q16. Do you know anyone from the previous generation who joined?

Q17. Do you believe in the 'One Country, Two Systems' policy?

Q18. All in all, how would you evaluate the HKSAR government and its system?

Q19. Do you have full understanding of the word, 'democracy' and the democratic norms?

Q19-1. Do you think a road to democracy is hard? Why?

Q20. Despite the loopholes, do you prefer Democracy than any other form of government?

Q21. Under certain circumstances, do you think an authoritarian government could be preferable than a democratic government?

Q22. Do you think there could be any discrimination against you due to your political involvement?

Q23. Are you willing to join movements/protests/demonstrations in the future?

## <Appendix 2> Survey Questionnaire

### Survey – Hong Kong's Post-80s/90s Generation

**\*PROCEED ONLY IF ANSWERED 'YES' FOR THIS ENTIRE SECTION**

- Are you either a post-80s generation (八零後) or a post-90s generation (九零後)? Y/N
- Do you hold a permanent Hong Kong Identity Card (HKID)? Y/N
- Do you currently reside in Hong Kong? Y/N
- Were you told this survey is a part of an academic research? Y/N
- Do you give full consent of your information to the interviewer for academic use? Y/N

#### < MULTIPLE CHOICE >

Q1. Please choose the year of your birth.

- 1) 1980
- 2) 1981
- 3) 1982
- 4) 1983
- 5) 1984
- 6) 1985
- 7) 1986
- 8) 1987
- 9) 1988
- 10) 1989
- 11) 1990
- 12) 1991
- 13) 1992
- 14) 1993
- 15) 1994
- 16) 1995
- 17) 1996
- 18) 1997
- 19) 1998
- 20) 1999

Q2. Please choose your gender.

- 1) Male
- 2) Female
- 3) Refuse to Answer

Q3. How many passports do you currently hold?

- 1) 1
- 2) 2
- 3) 3
- 4) 4 or more
- 5) Refuse to answer

Q4. Please choose passport(s) you currently hold.

- 1) HKSAR Passport
- 2) British National Overseas Passport
- 3) British Passport (Permanent)
- 4) Taiwan Passport (Republic of China)
- 5) Canadian Passport
- 6) Others (please specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 7) Refuse to answer

Q5. Please rate your language proficiency in Cantonese.

- 1) Basic
- 2) Intermediate
- 3) Quite fluent
- 4) Native
- 5) Refuse to answer

Q6. Please rate your language proficiency in English.

- 1) Basic
- 2) Intermediate
- 3) Quite fluent
- 4) Native
- 5) Refuse to answer

Q7. Please rate your language proficiency in Mandarin.

- 1) Basic
- 2) Intermediate
- 3) Quite fluent
- 4) Native
- 5) Refuse to answer

Q8. Is there any other foreign language or provincial dialect you speak?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

ONLY IF ANSWERED YES ON Q8, OTHERWISE SKIP TO Q10

Q9. Please rate the fluency of language you answered for Q8.

- 1) Basic
- 2) Intermediate
- 3) Quite fluent
- 4) Native
- 5) Refuse to answer

Q10. Please choose one of following best describes you.

- 1) Hongkonger
- 2) Chinese
- 3) Hongkonger in China
- 4) Chinese in Hong Kong
- 5) Asian
- 6) British
- 7) Others (please specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 8) Refuse to answer

Q11. For one to claim her/himself as a Hongkonger, does one's capability in speaking Cantonese to a native level important?

- 1) Very important
- 2) Important
- 3) Little
- 4) Not important
- 5) Refuse to answer

Q12. Do you agree Cantonese spoken in Hong Kong and elsewhere such as Guangdong Province are the same?

- 1) Strongly agree – absolutely same
- 2) Agree – similar
- 3) Disagree – not similar
- 4) Strongly disagree – not same at all or different
- 5) Refuse to answer

Q13. Do you feel the need or wish to speak such as English or Mandarin or any other languages?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

Q14. Are you a member of any kind of activist group/interest group/civil organisation?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

ONLY IF ANSWERED YES ON Q14, OTHERWISE SKIP TO Q16

Q15. What was the main reason for joining the activist group/interest group/organisation?

- 1) Self-made decision
- 2) Inspired by others
- 3) Curiosity
- 4) Pressured due to its popularity
- 5) Others (please specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 6) Refuse to answer

Q16. Have you ever participated in any kind of demonstration/protest/rally in Hong Kong?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

ONLY IF ANSWERED YES ON Q16, OTHERWISE SKIP TO Q19

Q17. Do you participate in demonstration/protest/rally in regular basis?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

Q18. What is your motivation/purpose/reason for your participation for joining demonstration/protest/rally?

- 1) Self-made decision
- 2) Inspired by others
- 3) Curiosity
- 4) Pressured due to its popularity
- 5) Others (please specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 6) Refuse to answer

Q19. Which of following best describes your way of political participation?

- 1) Joined/would join to protest alone
- 2) Joined/would join to protest in a group of few people
- 3) Joined/would join to protest with the group/society/organization
- 4) Others (please specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
- 5) Refuse to answer

Q20. Have you or your group have taken any part of solidarity with any Hong Kong based activist group/interest group/organization for a similar cause?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

Q21. Have you or your group have been in part of solidarity with any activist group/interest group/organization based overseas for a similar cause?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

Q22. Are you willing to join movements/protests/demonstrations in the future?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

**<AGREE-DISAGREE STATEMENTS>**

Q23. “All in all, I am proud of HKSAR government and its system”

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

Q24. “I think the HKSAR government and its system should be revised and have amendments accordingly.

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

Q25. “Democracy is always preferable to any other form of government”

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer


Q26. “Despite its loopholes, Democracy still is the best form of government”

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

Q27. “Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one”

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Refuse to answer

### <Appendix 3> Analytical Framework Modification



## <Appendix 4> Alternative Regression Analysis Model

<Table 5-1\*> Sources of Pride in HKSAR Government & System

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable (1) - Pride in HKSAR Government & System				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
birthyear	-0.066*** (-2.613)	-0.124 (-1.371)	-0.025 (-0.255)	-0.083 (-0.770)	-0.066 (-0.428)
male	0.455* (1.719)	0.476* (1.750)	0.434 (1.587)	0.458 (1.638)	0.457 (1.633)
eng_lv		0.100 (0.204)		-0.002 (-0.003)	-0.015 (-0.023)
man_lv		-0.274 (-0.657)		-0.329 (-0.695)	-0.331 (-0.701)
oth_for_lv		-0.044 (-0.210)		-0.091 (-0.388)	-0.101 (-0.413)
hk		-0.300 (-0.563)		-0.358 (-0.596)	-0.389 (-0.617)
canto_same		0.001 (0.003)		0.053 (0.154)	0.064 (0.181)
des_hk			-0.306 (-0.216)	-0.566 (-0.337)	-0.555 (-0.336)
des_hk_in_ch			0.137 (0.096)	0.349 (0.201)	0.274 (0.155)
des_ch†			0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
des_ch_in_hk			-0.101 (-0.073)	0.084 (0.050)	0.006 (0.004)
pas_hk			0.124 (0.090)	-0.205 (-0.119)	-0.163 (-0.095)
pas_can††			0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
dummy90					-0.359 (-0.157)
N	218	218	197	197	197
log likelihood	-64.084	-63.609	-62.781	-62.051	-62.038
chi2	10.019	10.969	8.141	9.600	9.625
p	0.007	0.140	0.228	0.567	0.649

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.

Constant is not reported.

z statistics in parentheses.

†, †† All respondents of the group answered same to the question hence excluded from the regression.



**<Table 5-2\*> Sources of Disloyalty to HKSAR Government & System**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable (2) - Disloyalty to the HKSAR Government & System				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
birthyear	0.288*** (9.714)	0.107 (1.233)	0.043 (0.543)	-0.007 (-0.074)	-0.417** (-2.162)
male	-0.333 (-1.263)	-0.292 (-1.049)	-0.204 (-0.678)	-0.201 (-0.643)	-0.222 (-0.674)
eng_lv		-0.209 (-0.498)		-1.028 (-1.075)	-0.974 (-1.062)
man_lv		-1.166*** (-2.672)		0.110 (0.231)	0.209 (0.440)
oth_for_lv		0.046 (0.281)		0.247 (1.183)	0.449 (1.624)
hk		0.274 (0.579)		-0.300 (-0.537)	0.289 (0.455)
canto_same		0.496 (1.360)		0.430 (1.100)	0.075 (0.139)
des_hk			-2.927 (-0.006)	-3.515 (-0.008)	-3.396 (-0.016)
des_hk_in_ch			-6.028 (-0.012)	-5.829 (-0.013)	-4.899 (-0.024)
des_ch†			0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
des_ch_in_hk			-5.620 (-0.012)	-5.237 (-0.011)	-4.148 (-0.020)
pas_hk			4.999 (0.010)	3.412 (0.007)	2.836 (0.014)
pas_can			0.550 (1.401)	0.688* (1.667)	0.625 (1.415)
dummy90					7.126** (2.524)
N	218	218	215	215	215
log likelihood	-63.808	-59.174	-51.501	-49.160	-45.279
chi2	170.454	179.722	189.966	194.649	202.411
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.

Constant is not reported.

z statistics in parentheses.

† All respondents of the group answered same to the question hence excluded from the regression.

**<Table 5-3\*> Sources of Absolute Preference on Democracy**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable (3) - Absolute Preference on Democracy				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
birthyear	0.231*** (9.679)	0.244*** (3.122)	0.083 (1.144)	0.072 (0.770)	-0.099 (-0.673)
male	-0.232 (-1.019)	-0.173 (-0.735)	-0.110 (-0.448)	-0.131 (-0.502)	-0.147 (-0.556)
eng_lv		-0.129 (-0.329)		-1.561 (-1.305)	-1.321 (-1.251)
man_lv		-0.069 (-0.193)		0.677* (1.850)	0.705* (1.935)
oth_for_lv		-0.052 (-0.379)		0.069 (0.426)	0.113 (0.663)
hk		1.148** (2.421)		0.610 (1.075)	0.932 (1.554)
canto_same		0.399 (1.183)		0.148 (0.377)	-0.106 (-0.214)
des_hk			-3.727 (-0.013)	-3.777 (-0.019)	-4.055 (-0.020)
des_hk_in_ch			-5.678 (-0.019)	-5.546 (-0.028)	-5.184 (-0.026)
des_ch			-4.912 (-0.017)	-4.380 (-0.022)	-4.024 (-0.020)
des_ch_in_hk			-5.343 (-0.018)	-5.134 (-0.026)	-4.751 (-0.024)
pas_hk			4.206 (0.014)	2.535 (0.013)	2.659 (0.013)
pas_can			0.206 (0.529)	0.253 (0.605)	0.191 (0.446)
dummy90					3.592 (1.532)
N	218	218	218	218	218
log likelihood	-82.867	-79.035	-72.116	-67.848	-66.546
chi2	130.505	138.171	152.008	160.543	163.148
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.

Constant is not reported.

z statistics in parentheses.

**<Table 5-4\*> Sources of Democracy as the Best Form of Government**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable (4) - Democracy as the Best Form of Government				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
birthyear	0.102*** (5.486)	0.096 (1.437)	0.076 (1.203)	0.038 (0.501)	0.063 (0.578)
male	0.095 (0.499)	0.173 (0.871)	0.238 (1.179)	0.216 (1.055)	0.213 (1.037)
eng_lv		0.362 (1.083)		-0.048 (-0.101)	-0.055 (-0.116)
man_lv		-0.333 (-1.096)		0.052 (0.156)	0.048 (0.143)
oth_for_lv		-0.082 (-0.586)		-0.044 (-0.283)	-0.054 (-0.344)
hk		0.988** (2.443)		0.516 (1.135)	0.463 (0.956)
canto_same		0.563** (1.975)		0.470 (1.596)	0.497 (1.614)
des_hk			-4.997 (-0.019)	-4.581 (-0.018)	-4.574 (-0.017)
des_hk_in_ch			-5.687 (-0.022)	-5.227 (-0.020)	-5.363 (-0.020)
des_ch†			0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
des_ch_in_hk			-5.373 (-0.020)	-4.877 (-0.019)	-5.022 (-0.019)
pas_hk			4.057 (0.015)	3.723 (0.014)	3.817 (0.015)
pas_can			0.237 (0.565)	0.331 (0.779)	0.334 (0.787)
dummy90					-0.546 (-0.321)
N	218	218	215	215	215
log likelihood	-122.415	-114.796	-112.073	-110.389	-110.338
chi2	33.150	48.389	51.367	54.735	54.837
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.

Constant is not reported.

z statistics in parentheses.

† All respondents of the group answered same to the question hence excluded from the regression.

**<Table 5-5\*> Sources of Circumstantial Preference on Authoritarianism**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable (5) - Circumstantial Preference on Authoritarianism				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
birthyear	-0.258*** (-10.147)	-0.275*** (-3.412)	-0.111 (-1.587)	-0.103 (-1.080)	0.044 (0.295)
male	0.616** (2.429)	0.572** (2.169)	0.550** (1.983)	0.626** (2.112)	0.643** (2.124)
eng_lv		-0.073 (-0.182)		0.763 (0.779)	0.688 (0.752)
man_lv		-0.016 (-0.043)		-0.766** (-2.041)	-0.791** (-2.110)
oth_for_lv		0.189 (1.317)		0.124 (0.756)	0.087 (0.505)
hk		-1.137** (-2.384)		-0.535 (-0.954)	-0.823 (-1.372)
canto_same		-0.400 (-1.134)		-0.116 (-0.271)	0.164 (0.292)
des_hk			3.383 (0.012)	3.476 (0.008)	3.679 (0.004)
des_hk_in_ch			5.279 (0.018)	5.612 (0.012)	5.280 (0.006)
des_ch†			0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
des_ch_in_hk			5.305 (0.018)	5.666 (0.012)	5.319 (0.006)
pas_hk			-3.822 (-0.013)	-3.367 (-0.007)	-3.345 (-0.004)
pas_can			-0.201 (-0.475)	-0.283 (-0.632)	-0.217 (-0.470)
dummy90					-3.064 (-1.307)
N	218	218	215	215	215
log likelihood	-73.351	-68.493	-62.036	-58.665	-57.740
chi2	154.334	164.050	172.300	179.042	180.892
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* for 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.

Constant is not reported.

z statistics in parentheses.

† All respondents of the group answered same to the question hence excluded from the regression.

## <Appendix 5> Field Trip (2016) 1:1 Interview Dialogue

### Field Trip (2016) 1:1 Interview

Date: 2<sup>th</sup> February 2016  
Venue: Causeway Bay, Hong Kong

**Interviewee: Joshua Wong (黃之鋒)**  
**Generation: Post-90s**

Q1. What is the year of your birth?  
1996

Q2. What is your gender?  
Male

Q3. How many passports do you currently hold?  
1

Q4. Could you please specify the countries of the issued passports you currently hold?  
HKSAR

Q5. Please rate your language proficiency in Cantonese  
Native, of course.

Q6. Please rate your language proficiency in English  
Hmm. Not so good. Intermediate.

Q7. Please rate your language proficiency in Mandarin  
I'd say intermediate.

Q8. Is there any other foreign language or provincial dialect you speak?  
No.

Q9. Please choose one or more ethnic identities best describes yourself.  
Hongkonger.

Q9-1. Could you please elaborate for choosing Hongkonger as your ethnic identity?  
Because I may be ethnically Chinese in theory but I don't see Hong Kong as a part of PRC.

Q9-2. What are the main differences between Hong Kong and People's Republic China?  
Hong Kong has Judicial independence, rule of law, separation of power but no democracy. Approximation of democracy however decreasing with interference of CCP to Hong Kong.

Q10. For one to claim her/himself as a Hongkonger, does one's capability in speaking Cantonese to a native

level important?

It is important.

Q10-1. How important is this? And the very reason is?

Because it is a unique language for Hongkongers and even within vast China, people don't understand Cantonese.

Q11. Do you agree Cantonese spoken in Hong Kong and elsewhere such as Guangdong Province are the same?

Similar but you still can tell the difference if you are from Hong Kong or Mainland China due to the accent and the tone.

Q12. Are you a member of any kind of activist group/interest group/civil organisation?

Yes, Scholarism. I am the founder of the group. It got established in 2011 to fight against the pro-communist textbook favouring PRC.

Q12-1. Born in 1996 makes you 19 this day, and 20 later on this year your birth in October. The establishment of Scholarism was in the year 2011, and this means you were 14-year-old back then. Could you explain for all the work you have done for political participation for having started at such a young age.

It was a self-made decision for my willingness to fight for democracy for Hong Kong. As a young political and social activist, I join and make campaigns, joined civil obedience, and for such act, facing trial at the end of February 2016. I hope to contribute to let the place I live to be better and I will keep doing.

Q13. Have you ever participated in any kind of demonstration/protest/rally in Hong Kong?

Yes, many times.

Q13-1. Could you provide me the full details? What, when, how and for?

More than fifty if not more. All different type and kind of protests. If you ask me how many times I attended, it's more than a hundred times. I attend monthly protests like 1<sup>st</sup> of July protest to embrace the day of the handover back in 1997 to ask for the universal suffrage. Also, June 4<sup>th</sup> assembly in memorial for the victims of the Tiananmen square incident asking for the old activists who are still under house arrest till today and the apology. Like I already said, in 2011, when I was 14, I made Scholarism to fight for anti-national education. Famous ones you know like Umbrella Revolution 2014 and also the 1 year anniversary protest also. Also for 2016, in January we peacefully rallied to free the Causeway booksellers. Them touching the sensitive subjects such as criticisms on the ruling party of PRC knowingly as CCP made them gone missing. The motive behind is for more fair society with justice, equal rights for the people so we can choose.

Q14. Amongst numerous movements/protests/demonstrations in Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement 2014 received the worldwide coverage. Why do you think this has whilst the others were relatively less known?

The new generation has raised a political awareness and got politically articulated.

Q14-1. For the use of tear gas use, aggressive police force, jail charge etc. throughout the 'Umbrella Movement', do you blame the HKSAR or the CCP?

Both HKSAR and CCP. CCP because NPC for the decision on the August 31<sup>st</sup> 2014. I think Tear gas was a HKSAR government's decision, however believe they noted the CCP before the actual use. They used it because they thought it was the only way to clear the road

Q14-2. In regard to the Umbrella Movement, most of the media and the scholars view it has failed. What is your take on this?

We might seem to have been defeated however I do believe in the long run we will achieve what we are as great residents of Hong Kong with liberties we deserve. And we will go for the memorial protests like the 1<sup>st</sup> year anniversary of Umbrella Revolution, I hope to remind people even without the concrete result, we

will still fight for democracy.

Q15. Have you or your group have taken any part of solidarity with any Hong Kong or overseas based activist group/interest group/organization for a similar cause?

Yes, I cannot name them all but for example today, before this interview I flew from Japan to Hong Kong for an interview with you. Japanese student organisations and many different institutions not only Japan but solidarity is found globally. I was invited to give a speech in top universities in the U.K. like Oxford, Cambridge, Imperial College, King College London, LSE, UCL, Queen Mary and more.

Q16. Do you know anyone from the previous generation who joined?

A few. Usual and common for older generation to be conservative and they are. The Democratic Party who is also standing on our side is an older generation. Before umbrella revolution, a half million people were in the protest in year 2003, to fight against the article 23 which is the national security law. Eye-catching scene by an older generation's participation in the street rallying for a withdrawal.

Q16-1. Do you feel the generation gap? What?

Older generation has tendency to stand against the civil disobedience. Like it's a bad thing for them.

Q17. Do you believe in the 'One Country, Two Systems' policy?

No, it has been eroded by the CCP. Hong Kong already started to dissolve into PRC's system, which favours the CCP. And this got to be put to an end. CCP promised the universal suffrage after 20 years the handover, however we still get nothing and the hope was once created however has vanished by the CCP.

Q18. All in all, how would you evaluate the HKSAR government and its system?

No pride for neither of government nor system.

Q19. Do you have full understanding of the word, 'democracy' and the democratic norms?

A system where gives the equal chance to decide who is going to rule Hong Kong. Development of the civil society, political and civil liberties.

Q19-1. Do you think a road to democracy is hard? Why?

Democracy is hard as it is and with the different country specifics in according culture and customs, it even could be harder.

Q20. Despite the loopholes, do you prefer Democracy than any other form of government?

I do understand democracy is not basket of goodies, look at US it's a prime example. It has many loopholes in the constitution and like the millions of the fundraising for the presidency and all tycoons are well connected to the politicians and that's where the lobbying and political maneuvering is going behind the curtains. Although democracy is going to be a bumpy road to however, minimum requirement is the vote.

Q21. Under certain circumstances, do you think an authoritarian government could be preferable than a democratic government?

No.

Q22. Do you think there could be any discrimination against you due to your political involvement?

Yes, I already am banned to go to Malaysia, Mainland China, however I was prepared for this from the beginning but I know what I want and it won't stop me.

Q23. Are you willing to join movements/protests/demonstrations in the future?

Yes, for the liberties we deserve.

## Field Trip (2016) 1:1 Interview

Date: 27<sup>th</sup> January 2016  
Venue: Admiralty, Hong Kong

**Interviewee: Prince Wong Ji Yuet (黃子悅)**  
**Generation: Post-90s**

Q1. What is the year of your birth?  
1997.

Q2. What is your gender?  
Female.

Q3. How many passports do you currently hold?  
One.

Q4. Could you please specify the countries of the issued passports you currently hold?  
HKSAR passport.

Q5. Please rate your language proficiency in Cantonese  
Native.

Q6. Please rate your language proficiency in English  
I say intermediate.

Q7. Please rate your language proficiency in Mandarin  
Intermediate.

Q8. Is there any other foreign language or provincial dialect you speak?  
No.

Q9. Please choose one or more ethnic identities best describe yourself.  
HongKonger

Q9-1. Could you further elaborate for choosing Hongkonger as your main ethnic identity?  
My birthplace, it is something that represents myself, something that I am proud of. I am glad to say I am from Hong Kong.

Q9-2. What are the main differences between Hong Kong and People's Republic China?  
Pluralistic society, Judicial independence, rule of law unlike mainland where the freedom is banned like ban on Google, Facebook, and Whatsapp messenger, more importantly, the absence of mindset.

Q10. For one to claim her/himself as a Hongkonger, does one's capability in speaking Cantonese to a native level important?  
Very important.

Q10-1. Why would think it is very important? What is the very reason for?



Being able to speak Cantonese makes you to understand the Hong Kong culture and the mentality.

Q11. Do you agree Cantonese spoken in Hong Kong and elsewhere such as Guangdong Province are the same?

Similar but you can tell who is Hongkonger.

Q12. Are you a member of any kind of activist group/interest group/civil organisation?

Yes, Scholarism. I am the spokesman.

Q12-1. What was the motive or should I say purpose for joining Scholarism as a core member (spokesman)? Was it a self-made decision? Or were you inspired by anything? Curiosity? Etc?

It was a self-made decision. Fight for democracy. I joined because of Umbrella Movement. Before I was an ordinary student. Thought can I do more for the future of Hong Kong.

Q13. Have you ever participated in any kind of demonstration/protest/rally in Hong Kong?

Yes, many times. Before joining Scholarism, I joined to fight for 'anti-use Putonghua' to Hong Kong kids because I believe it's not good to Hong Kong culture. But my first participation was in 2010 when I was 13. It was for Tiananmen RIP movement. I went with my family and family friends to support for democracy. My dad talked a lot about things happened in China and the protests to fight against the CCP government then I started to care about this thing. Dad has been attending this annually and I went along.

Q13-1. Could you please tell me all the demonstration/protest/rally you have joined with full details in sequential order?

2010 Tiananmen RIP movement

2011 Anti-Putonghua use to the Hong Kong children

2013 Anti-patriot education attempt (2012)

2014 Umbrella Movement

2015 1 year anniversary Umbrella's movement

2016 Copyright change for the content freedom

These are the big ones people know but also attend the monthly or weekly ones. It's been 3 years.

Q13-2. What are the main reasons for many involvements you have made?

To protect the liberty of Hong Kong and though I am young I have the power to influence the Hong Kong government and the society. Because the politics is really important to my life and to the future of Hong Kong. It's all getting worse and felt the need to step in.

Q13-3. In total, how many different kinds of movements/protests/demonstrations have you joined?

More than 10 protests.

Q14. Amongst numerous movements/protests/demonstrations in Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement 2014 received the worldwide coverage. Why do you think this has whilst the others were relatively less known?

I think the trigger for the mass movement in the Umbrella Movement 2014 is the tear gas use by the Hong Kong police. In the very beginning, students gave some food to policemen, because they are also Hongkongers and were just doing the job. But the attitude towards the Hong Kong police has changed since the Umbrella. Some call them 'hak ging' which means the 'black police'. The seven policemen kicked one of the protesters, then the name was given, like a metaphor from the hei si hui (Hong Kong triads). Also when some people were walking by the Mongkok, just pure pedestrians, police could suddenly beat them with the violent language use. Hong Kong police image has gone bad. I am sure tear gas use by the police helped the coverage for Hong Kong because it shouldn't have happened in a place like Hong Kong. Umbrella movement period was the exam period and for me. It was the university entrance exam period. (HKDSE – Hong Kong Diploma of Secondary Education) but went on for the hunger strike.

Q14-1. For the use of tear gas use, aggressive police force, jail charge etc. throughout the 'Umbrella Movement', do you blame the HKSAR or the CCP?

I blame the both. I believe HKSAR had or has decision for the tear gas, but I think CCP has influenced in the way through the use of it or other major decisions.

Q14-2. In regard to the Umbrella Movement, some or arguably the most of the media and the scholars view it has failed. What is your take on this?

Not failure. On 26<sup>th</sup> January 2016, at the Hong Kong University, the mass gathered to fight for the CE, C. Y. Leung's control over the university. Claiming that its not fair and called for more people. It depends on the matter of attitude. Umbrella movement may have ended but our fight is not. No success on political systems, but the society now is more willing to talk about politics than before. It's not a revolution yet, but a movement for now. The ultimate aim for the umbrella movement is a political reform. It Has not reached the level of 'revolution' yet.

Q15. Have you or your group have taken any part of solidarity with any Hong Kong or overseas based activist group/interest group/organization for a similar cause?

Joshua Wong and other few core members of Scholarism have. We have solidarity with Hong Kong based organisations and also Taiwan, Japan and few European countries. Also U.S.A.

Q16. Do you know anyone from the previous generation who joined.

No.

Q16-1. Do you feel the generation gap? What?

Yes, definitely, for example after the umbrella, young people don't believe in one country two systems policy, but some old generation still does believe in it. They're used to the system.

Q16-2. Do you think the Hong Kong's young people including the students today are more politically active?

Thanks to the umbrella, atmosphere of the society is different now. Students used to not talk about the politics. But the vibe has changed.

Q17. Do you believe in the 'One Country, Two Systems' policy?

Yes, maybe before the umbrella revolution, I still believed to a little degree but then now more and more don't. As Hong Kong's independence is disappearing. If we don't fight for this, that promised 50 years of the system could come even a way before.

Q18. All in all, how would you evaluate the HKSAR government and its system?

I am not proud of it. I think they should make changes to include Hong Kong peoples' voice.

Q19. Do you have full understanding of the word, 'democracy' and the democratic norms?

Yes, it means people have equal rights, have rights to express themselves, freedom to vote.

Freedom to vote could be seen as democratic but barring out the candidates CCP doesn't favour, is not democracy.

Q19-1. Do you think a road to democracy is hard? Why?

Very hard. Maintaining democracy is hard. Long-term work.

Q19-2. Would you support for the democracy in mainland China?

Not going to put the same effort. Not enough time, and my priority and importance lie on Hong Kong.

Q20. Despite the loopholes, do you prefer Democracy than any other form of government?

Yes.

Q21. Under certain circumstances, do you think an authoritarian government could be preferable than a democratic government?

No.

Q22. Do you think there could be any discrimination against you due to your political involvement?

For example, a career-wise, maybe banned to go to certain places in certain sectors. Like Joshua Wong couldn't go to Malaysia.

Q23. Are you willing to join movements/protests/demonstrations in the future?

Yes, anything for Hong Kong. Because I'm aware of 'One Country, Two Systems' policy would be effective for 50 years. Those 50 years would eventually come and feel the need to involve.

## Field Trip (2016) 1:1 Interview

Date: 27<sup>th</sup> January 2016  
Venue: Admiralty, Hong Kong

**Interviewee: Tommy Tsang (曾達恩)**  
**Generation: Post-80s**

Q1. What is the year of your birth?  
1989.

Q2. What is your gender?  
Male.

Q3. How many passports do you currently hold?  
One.

Q4. Could you please specify the countries of the issued passports you currently hold?  
HKSAR passport.

Q5. Please rate your language proficiency in Cantonese  
Native.

Q6. Please rate your language proficiency in English  
Intermediate.

Q7. Please rate your language proficiency in Mandarin  
Intermediate.

Q8. Is there any other foreign language or provincial dialect you speak?  
No.

Q9. Please choose one or more ethnic identities best describe yourself.  
HongKonger

Q9-1. Could you further elaborate for choosing Hongkonger as your main ethnic identity?  
I hold HKSAR passport and I am Chinese. Passport says its Chinese, but people here don't like it. Because the Chinese behavior and living style is not quite like Chinese. But some see as hongkonger in china. Elderlies think they are Chinese.

Q9-2. What are the main differences between Hong Kong and People's Republic China?  
Hong Kong has rule of law and manners.

Q10. For one to claim her/himself as a Hongkonger, does one's capability in speaking Cantonese to a native level important?  
Important.

Q10-1. Why would think it is very important? What is the very reason for?

Or else, anyone can be Hongkonger

Q11. Do you agree Cantonese spoken in Hong Kong and elsewhere such as Guangdong Province are the same?

Yes, the tone and accent.

Q12. Are you a member of any kind of activist group/interest group/civil organisation?

No.

Q12-1. Could you elaborate further for not joining any society or group?

I self-willingly joined. Actually it's not organised by anyone. We are going out by our own willingness.

Q13. Have you ever participated in any kind of demonstration/protest/rally in Hong Kong?

Yes, many. Also the Umbrella Movement.

Q13-1. Could you please tell me all the demonstration/protest/rally you have joined with full details in sequential order?

2003 Economic Bill (under CE Tung Jian Hua)

2014 Umbrella Movement

2016 Copyright change for the content freedom

2016 University Education Freedom, Internet Freedom

Since 2009, it got more political.

Q13-2. Is there a particular reason for you not having attended to the Umbrella Movement's 1 year anniversary?

Felt useless, no big topic and felt no target audience.

Q13-3. Do you consider yourself as a political/social activist?

Yes, when things happened during the midnight, I did not hesitate to be in the places where people needed me.

Q14. Amongst numerous movements/protests/demonstrations in Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement 2014 received the worldwide coverage whilst the others were relatively less known?

I think the tear gas and the police force. The fight is with CCP not HKSAR. We hate policemen, they actually have choice to treat the students little better but they did not.

Q14-1. For the use of tear gas use, aggressive police force, jail charge etc. throughout the 'Umbrella Movement', do you blame the HKSAR or the CCP?

Both. Although it's granted high autonomy, such big action must have been proved by the CCP so ultimately, it's the CCP who ordered it.

Q15. Have you or your group have taken any part of solidarity with any Hong Kong or overseas based activist group/interest group/organization for a similar cause?

No.

Q16. Do you know anyone from the previous generation who joined?

Yes, I only heard through people. Word of mouth. I know June 4<sup>th</sup> was really terrible.

Q16-1. Do you feel the generation gap? What?

Yes, elders' mindset is different. They don't care about the society. They are quite selfish and take care of their families rather than the society.

Q16-2. Do you think the Hong Kong's young people including the students today are more politically active?

Young generation has definitely changed. They create groups and organise and fight.

Q17. Do you believe in the 'One Country, Two Systems' policy?

No. In my secondary school and high school, that's what I learned, but more and more I now think government destroyed the policy and such thing is not here. It's already china now, even with the basic law, joint declaration is all interpreted by the CCP. The ultimate interpretation depends on China. 50 year plan got even shortened, now has only few years.

Q18. All in all, how would you evaluate the HKSAR government and its system?

I am proud of the system but not the government. The system is effective.

Q19. Do you have full understanding of the word, 'democracy' and the democratic norms?

Not even 3% would actually understood what democracy meant. But now they do and now I do. We never had a chance to know what democracy was like under U.K. Our democracy is very limited. We want to vote our own CE. I understand it can bring corruption. We are learning what democracy is via Taiwan. That's what we want.

Q19-1. Democracy is always preferable to any other form of government?

Agree, it hears peoples' voices.

Q19-2. Would you support for the democracy in mainland China?

No, it's not my place. My nation is Hong Kong. I know it's not a nation. But it is for me.

Q20. Despite the loopholes, do you prefer Democracy than any other form of government?

Agree. The loopholes can be amended.

Q21. Under certain circumstances, do you think an authoritarian government could be preferable than a democratic government?

Agree. The government really listen and hear peoples' voices, that is more important.

Q22. Do you think there could be any discrimination against you due to your political involvement?

Yes, for example, at work place, depending on the boss's political preference, this political involvement could put you in the difficult position. I know so many friends who work in mainland Chinese companies who are banned from going out for the protests.

Q23. Are you willing to join movements/protests/demonstrations in the future?

Yes, fight is not finished yet. China now wants to install a fast train (gao tie) between Beijing and Hong Kong (in west Kowloon) which will connect many megacities such as shanghai. But people here are against it, not only because the mainland people will flood in, but mostly against it because they want to attach the Chinese law to the HK Basic law. Because the railway installment will bridge the mainland and the Hong Kong peninsula. Thus CCP claims connecting the two makes a room for the need of an addition to the basic law (that Chinese law should be partly added to the basic law). This is coming, it's not a hot issue just yet, but Hong Kong is yet to face many mountains.

## Field Trip (2016) 1:1 Interview

Date: 27<sup>th</sup> January 2016  
Venue: Admiralty, Hong Kong

**Interviewee: Lola (fake name)**  
**Generation: Post-80s**

Q1. What is the year of your birth?  
1997.

Q2. What is your gender?  
Female.

Q3. How many passports do you currently hold?  
One.

Q4. Could you please specify the countries of the issued passports you currently hold?  
HKSAR passport.

Q5. Please rate your language proficiency in Cantonese  
Native.

Q6. Please rate your language proficiency in English  
Fluent.

Q7. Please rate your language proficiency in Mandarin  
Fluent.

Q8. Is there any other foreign language or provincial dialect you speak?  
No.

Q9. Please choose one or more ethnic identities best describe yourself.  
HongKonger and Chinese

Q9-1. Could you further elaborate for choosing Hongkonger as your main ethnic identity?  
Place of my birth, Hong Kong citizen and I live in Hong Kong.

Q9-2. What are the main differences between Hong Kong and People's Republic China?  
Law and Respect.

Q10. For one to claim her/himself as a Hongkonger, does one's capability in speaking Cantonese to a native level important?  
Important.

Q10-1. Why would think it is very important? What is the very reason for?  
Distinguishes whether Hongkonger or not.

Q11. Do you agree Cantonese spoken in Hong Kong and elsewhere such as Guangdong Province are the same?

Accent is different.

Q12. Are you a member of any kind of activist group/interest group/civil organisation?

No.

Q12-1. What was the reason for not joining any kind of activist group/interest group/civil organisation?

Unnecessary. But I will join things for Hong Kong's better future.

Q13. Have you ever participated in any kind of demonstration/protest/rally in Hong Kong?

Umbrella Movement and several sit-ins.

Q13-1. Could you please tell me all the demonstration/protest/rally you have joined with full details in sequential order?

2014 Umbrella Movement and small size sit-ins for economic reforms.

Q13-2. What are the main reasons for many involvements you have made?

Everybody went fought for Hong Kong. I also felt I had to join.

Q13-3. In total, how many different kinds of movements/protests/demonstrations have you joined?

Three.

Q14. Amongst numerous movements/protests/demonstrations in Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement 2014 received the worldwide coverage. Why do you think this has whilst the others were relatively less known?

Maybe because many people protested? Maybe also because many young students came out.

Q14-1. For the use of tear gas use, aggressive police force, jail charge etc. throughout the 'Umbrella Movement', do you blame the HKSAR or the CCP?

Both. Either way, they both must be related to this.

Q14-2. In regard to the Umbrella Movement, some or arguably the most of the media and the scholars view it has failed. What is your take on this?

I agree. We did not achieve what we went out on streets for.

Q15. Have you or your group have taken any part of solidarity with any Hong Kong or overseas based activist group/interest group/organization for a similar cause?

No, but few of my Taiwanese friends joined.

Q16. Do you know anyone from the previous generation who joined?

Yes, but only a few.

Q16-1. Do you feel the generation gap? What?

It seems like young people are more likely to come out on streets and fearless of the government. They form big groups and do it together.

Q16-2. Do you think the Hong Kong's young people including the students today are more politically active?

Sure. Definitely. Compared to my generation.



Q17. Do you believe in the 'One Country, Two Systems' policy?

I did believe it. I still do but I don't think people share my view.

Q18. All in all, how would you evaluate the HKSAR government and its system?

I am proud of it but they are mostly pro-China.

Q19. Do you have full understanding of the word, 'democracy' and the democratic norms?

Yeah, I think so. Democracy allows you to vote, say freely.

Q19-1. Do you think a road to democracy is hard? Why?

Hard, I think. Many countries want it but they still don't have it.

Q19-2. Would you support for the democracy in mainland China?

Yes, people there want it too.

Q20. Despite the loopholes, do you prefer Democracy than any other form of government?

Controversial but yeah.

Q21. Under certain circumstances, do you think an authoritarian government could be preferable than a democratic government?

No.

Q22. Do you think there could be any discrimination against you due to your political involvement?

Pro-China people can have some anti-sentiments against me.

Q23. Are you willing to join movements/protests/demonstrations in the future?

Yes, but only if I think the cause is convincing.

## Field Trip (2016) 1:1 Interview

Date: 27<sup>th</sup> January 2016  
Venue: Admiralty, Hong Kong

**Interviewee: Shu (fake name)**  
**Generation: Post-90s**

Q1. What is the year of your birth?  
1995.

Q2. What is your gender?  
Male.

Q3. How many passports do you currently hold?  
One.

Q4. Could you please specify the countries of the issued passports you currently hold?  
HKSAR passport.

Q5. Please rate your language proficiency in Cantonese  
Native.

Q6. Please rate your language proficiency in English  
Between basic and intermediate.

Q7. Please rate your language proficiency in Mandarin  
Intermediate.

Q8. Is there any other foreign language or provincial dialect you speak?  
No.

Q9. Please choose one or more ethnic identities best describe yourself.  
Hongkonger

Q9-1. Could you further elaborate for choosing Hongkonger as your main ethnic identity?  
It is natural for me to say I'm Hongkonger because that is what I am.

Q9-2. What are the main differences between Hong Kong and People's Republic China?  
A lot of things. For example, language, lifestyle, culture and etc.

Q10. For one to claim her/himself as a Hongkonger, does one's capability in speaking Cantonese to a native level important?  
Very important.

Q10-1. Why would think it is very important? What is the very reason for?  
If not, even mainland people can be Hongkonger too.

Q11. Do you agree Cantonese spoken in Hong Kong and elsewhere such as Guangdong Province are the same?

Different. I can tell who is mainlander.

Q12. Are you a member of any kind of activist group/interest group/civil organisation?

Yes.

Q12-1. What was the motive or should I say purpose for joining such? Was it a self-made decision? Or were you inspired by anything? Curiosity? Etc?

It was a self-made decision. I wanted to meet other people who also had same idea and wanted to fight together.

Q13. Have you ever participated in any kind of demonstration/protest/rally in Hong Kong?

A lot. More than 10 times.

Q13-1. Could you please tell me all the demonstration/protest/rally you have joined with full details in sequential order?

2010 Tiananmen RIP movement

2011 Anti-Putonghua use to the Hong Kong children

2013 Anti-patriot education attempt (2012)

2014 Umbrella Movement

2015 1 year anniversary Umbrella's movement

2016 Copyright change for the content freedom

Also, I do many weekly, monthly and annual rallies and sit-ins. Most of them are peaceful but sometimes gets extreme like hunger strikes.

Q13-2. What are the main reasons for many involvements you have made?

In order to protect Hong Kong.

Q13-3. In total, how many different kinds of movements/protests/demonstrations have you joined?

Something like 10?

Q14. Amongst numerous movements/protests/demonstrations in Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement 2014 received the worldwide coverage. Why do you think this has whilst the others were relatively less known?

Maybe because it reminds people of the June 4<sup>th</sup> incident? 'Beijing did once, so they can do it again' kind of fear?

Q14-1. For the use of tear gas use, aggressive police force, jail charge etc. throughout the 'Umbrella Movement', do you blame the HKSAR or the CCP?

CCP. Since CY Leung is very fond of CCP, I don't think he would have done it but consulted with Beijing for a solution.

Q14-2. In regard to the Umbrella Movement, some or arguably the most of the media and the scholars view it has failed. What is your take on this?

On one hand, it did fail so did we. But one the other hand, we showed what we can do. Now Beijing worries what can happen in Hong Kong.

Q15. Have you or your group have taken any part of solidarity with any Hong Kong or overseas based

activist group/interest group/organization for a similar cause?

Yes, from America, Europe and other Asian countries. Especially student organisations helped us a lot.

Q16. Do you know anyone from the previous generation who joined?

I saw some people in the street. On our side.

Q16-1. Do you feel the generation gap? What?

Absolutely. They think different from us. They think they have no choice but follow the decisions that politicians make.

Q16-2. Do you think the Hong Kong's young people including the students today are more politically active?

Yeah, more than before. We talk about politics very naturally now.

Q17. Do you believe in the 'One Country, Two Systems' policy?

No, China wants Hong Kong to be little China.

Q18. All in all, how would you evaluate the HKSAR government and its system?

They are pro-China, and politicians do not think about us but themselves like for example, the next promotion.

Q19. Do you have full understanding of the word, 'democracy' and the democratic norms?

Election, freedom of speech, freedom of media and no corruption.

Q19-1. Do you think a road to democracy is hard? Why?

Yes, because people by nature could be easily corrupted.

Q19-2. Would you support for the democracy in mainland China?

No. Only for Hong Kong.

Q20. Despite the loopholes, do you prefer Democracy than any other form of government?

Yes, democracy is the only way.

Q21. Under certain circumstances, do you think an authoritarian government could be preferable than a democratic government?

No, then how are we different from China?

Q22. Do you think there could be any discrimination against you due to your political involvement?

Yes, already some people I know don't like what I do.

Q23. Are you willing to join movements/protests/demonstrations in the future?

For Hong Kong, I so as all Hongkongers should.

## Field Trip (2016) 1:1 Interview

Date: 27<sup>th</sup> January 2016  
Venue: Admiralty, Hong Kong

**Interviewee: Augustus (fake name)**  
**Generation: Post-90s**

Q1. What is the year of your birth?  
1994.

Q2. What is your gender?  
Female.

Q3. How many passports do you currently hold?  
One.

Q4. Could you please specify the countries of the issued passports you currently hold?  
HKSAR passport.

Q5. Please rate your language proficiency in Cantonese  
Native.

Q6. Please rate your language proficiency in English  
Intermediate.

Q7. Please rate your language proficiency in Mandarin  
Intermediate.

Q8. Is there any other foreign language or provincial dialect you speak?  
Yes, Hokkien dialect.

Q9. Please choose one or more ethnic identities best describe yourself.  
HongKonger

Q9-1. Could you further elaborate for choosing Hongkonger as your main ethnic identity?  
Born and bred in Hong Kong.

Q9-2. What are the main differences between Hong Kong and People's Republic China?  
Mind-set is very different. Chinese people are loud and nosy. Hong Kong people have respect for others and we behave in the public sphere.

Q10. For one to claim her/himself as a Hongkonger, does one's capability in speaking Cantonese to a native level important?  
Very important.

Q10-1. Why would think it is very important? What is the very reason for?

So we know people are from here or not.

Q11. Do you agree Cantonese spoken in Hong Kong and elsewhere such as Guangdong Province are the same?

Different. Hong Kong people can know if you are from here or immigrant from the Mainland.

Q12. Are you a member of any kind of activist group/interest group/civil organisation?

Yes.

Q12-1. What was the motive or should I say purpose for joining such? Was it a self-made decision? Or were you inspired by anything? Curiosity?

I was inspired by my close friends but mostly the young student leaders on streets.

Q13. Have you ever participated in any kind of demonstration/protest/rally in Hong Kong?

I joined the street protests since 2013, the anti-patriot education attempt. Then, the Umbrella Movement.

Q13-1. Could you please tell me all the demonstration/protest/rally you have joined with full details in sequential order?

2013 Anti-patriot education attempt (2012)

2014 Umbrella Movement

2015 1 year anniversary Umbrella's movement

2016 Fishball Revolution

Q13-2. What are the main reasons for many involvements you have made?

To stand against the injustice.

Q13-3. In total, how many different kinds of movements/protests/demonstrations have you joined?

Nice or ten.

Q14. Amongst numerous movements/protests/demonstrations in Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement 2014 received the worldwide coverage. Why do you think this has whilst the others were relatively less known?

Occupying central act is dramatic. The financial district was filled with people on the roads and streets.

Q14-1. For the use of tear gas use, aggressive police force, jail charge etc. throughout the 'Umbrella Movement', do you blame the HKSAR or the CCP?

Both. They must have colluded.

Q14-2. In regard to the Umbrella Movement, some or arguably the most of the media and the scholars view it has failed. What is your take on this?

In terms of the result, we might have failed but the bright side is that now the whole world knows China didn't change.

Q15. Have you or your group have taken any part of solidarity with any Hong Kong or overseas based activist group/interest group/organization for a similar cause?

Yes, through many applications like skype and dropbox, we shared our thoughts and footage.

Q16. Do you know anyone from the previous generation who joined?

I heard through people but no one close to myself.

Q16-1. Do you feel the generation gap? What?

Old people are still scared of China. I don't blame them because they witnessed the Tiananmen Massacre, but young people are brave and ready to fight.

Q16-2. Do you think the Hong Kong's young people including the students today are more politically active?

Yes, they do interviews with media, and like me agree to do the interview with you.

Q17. Do you believe in the 'One Country, Two Systems' policy?

Once. But not anymore.

Q18. All in all, how would you evaluate the HKSAR government and its system?

I am proud but CY Leung has to go.

Q19. Do you have full understanding of the word, 'democracy' and the democratic norms?

Democracy means people do election and pick the leaders by the majority votes.

Q19-1. Do you think a road to democracy is hard? Why?

It is hard. Also after democracy is hard. Because it only favours the majority.

Q19-2. Would you support for the democracy in mainland China?

I don't think so. Hong Kong is my priority.

Q20. Despite the loopholes, do you prefer Democracy than any other form of government?

Of course. Democracy is the best system.

Q21. Under certain circumstances, do you think an authoritarian government could be preferable than a democratic government?

I don't think so. Authoritarian government can be corrupted.

Q22. Do you think there could be any discrimination against you due to your political involvement?

Yes, I already got blame by many people including my parents.

Q23. Are you willing to join movements/protests/demonstrations in the future?

I am not too sure, but the way I feel now, I think I will.

## Field Trip (2016) 1:1 Interview

Date: 27<sup>th</sup> January 2016  
Venue: Admiralty, Hong Kong

**Interviewee: Saskia (fake name)**  
**Generation: Post-90s**

Q1. What is the year of your birth?  
1997.

Q2. What is your gender?  
Male.

Q3. How many passports do you currently hold?  
One.

Q4. Could you please specify the countries of the issued passports you currently hold?  
HKSAR passport.

Q5. Please rate your language proficiency in Cantonese  
Native.

Q6. Please rate your language proficiency in English  
Intermediate.

Q7. Please rate your language proficiency in Mandarin  
Intermediate.

Q8. Is there any other foreign language or provincial dialect you speak?  
No.

Q9. Please choose one or more ethnic identities best describe yourself.  
HongKonger

Q9-1. Could you further elaborate for choosing Hongkonger as your main ethnic identity?  
I was born here, I speak Cantonese, my passport is HKSAR, I am Hongkonger.

Q9-2. What are the main differences between Hong Kong and People's Republic China?  
China is a communist country; Hong Kong is not. It embraces capitalist system and we are law-abiding citizens.

Q10. For one to claim her/himself as a Hongkonger, does one's capability in speaking Cantonese to a native level important?  
Very important.

Q10-1. Why would think it is very important? What is the very reason for?



If you don't speak Cantonese, how can you be a Hongkonger?

Q11. Do you agree Cantonese spoken in Hong Kong and elsewhere such as Guangdong Province are the same?

Not same at all. The tone, accent, words are different.

Q12. Are you a member of any kind of activist group/interest group/civil organisation?

Yes.

Q12-1. What was the motive or should I say purpose for joining such? Was it a self-made decision? Or were you inspired by anything? Curiosity?

Few years ago, I saw many people of my age joining the demonstration. I once thought it was dangerous but then I realised we all should do it. I guess, half-half? I was inspired by people but it was my choice to join in the end.

Q13. Have you ever participated in any kind of demonstration/protest/rally in Hong Kong?

Yes, many times.

Q13-1. Could you please tell me all the demonstration/protest/rally you have joined with full details in sequential order?

2010 Tiananmen RIP movement

2011 Anti-Putonghua use to the Hong Kong children

2013 Anti-patriot education attempt (2012)

2014 Umbrella Movement

Also the relatively less-known mid-size rallies, sit-ins, protests.

Q13-2. What are the main reasons for many involvements you have made?

To fight for the 'One Country, Two Systems' policy. The policy promised to Hong Kong.

Q13-3. In total, how many different kinds of movements/protests/demonstrations have you joined?

More than ten.

Q14. Amongst numerous movements/protests/demonstrations in Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement 2014 received the worldwide coverage. Why do you think this has whilst the others were relatively less known?

Because Beijing broke the promise. In 2007, they said from the next election, they will bring the universal suffrage for Hong Kong's chief executive election.

Q14-1. For the use of tear gas use, aggressive police force, jail charge etc. throughout the 'Umbrella Movement', do you blame the HKSAR or the CCP?

Both. I am sure HKSAR asked for CCP's permission though.

Q14-2. In regard to the Umbrella Movement, some or arguably the most of the media and the scholars view it has failed. What is your take on this?

Some people call it 'Umbrella Revolution'. Neither of Hong Kong or Mainland China went through a political upheaval like recent scene. I think itself is already a success.

Q15. Have you or your group have taken any part of solidarity with any Hong Kong or overseas based activist group/interest group/organization for a similar cause?

Yes, we had an official support via media, social network, hand-written letters. Like they stood for us,

we will for them when they need us.

Q16. Do you know anyone from the previous generation who joined?

No.

Q16-1. Do you feel the generation gap? What?

Old generation thinks we are damned generation. They think we don't earn much and only know how to protest. But the truth is we know what we are doing, and we are doing this because we think what we are asking for is what we deserve.

Q16-2. Do you think the Hong Kong's young people including the students today are more politically active?

Yes, thankfully Hong Kong's future is not like the old generation. We don't keep the silence, if we see something is not right, we will speak for it.

Q17. Do you believe in the 'One Country, Two Systems' policy?

I do but then Beijing breached it.

Q18. All in all, how would you evaluate the HKSAR government and its system?

I am, but HKSAR government should stay distant from the Beijing.

Q19. Do you have full understanding of the word, 'democracy' and the democratic norms?

Yes, equal rights, votes and freedom.

Q19-1. Do you think a road to democracy is hard? Why?

Democracy is hard because, not everyone can be happy with the result.

Q19-2. Would you support for the democracy in mainland China?

Yes, if they need our help.

Q20. Despite the loopholes, do you prefer Democracy than any other form of government?

Yeah, democracy like any other things can be imperfect, but it is the best we have so far.

Q21. Under certain circumstances, do you think an authoritarian government could be preferable than a democratic government?

No, because under authoritarian government, we do not have freedom.

Q22. Do you think there could be any discrimination against you due to your political involvement?

I might not be able to get a job or get discrimination by certain people.

Q23. Are you willing to join movements/protests/demonstrations in the future?

Yes, for Hong Kong I will.

## Abstract (Korean)

### 국 문 초 록

성명: 양지연

학과 및 전공: 국제학과 국제협력전공

서울대학교 국제대학원

본 논문은 베네딕트 앤더슨의 “상상의 공동체” (“Imagined Communities”)라는 민족주의 분석틀을 이용하여 이른 바 홍콩의 지우링허우 세대, 즉 90년 候 세대의 정치참여 특징을 살펴보고자 하였다. 1997년 홍콩반환 이후 오늘날 홍콩반도에서는 이례적이게 연속성을 띄는 학생시위가 지속되어 오고있는데, 이와 같은 현상 속 세가지 공통적인 특징을 보인다. 첫번째 특징으로, 시위의 연속성과 시위 성격의 유사성, 두번째로 이례적인 홍콩 그리고 홍콩적 가치의 강조, 마지막으로 90년 候 세대의 정치참여이다.

이는 실로 홍콩의 엄청난 변화이며 또한 새로운 패러다임의 서막이다. 홍콩반환 후 첫 세대인 지우링허우 세대는 기성세대의 소극적인 자세를 뛰어넘은 것은 물론 2014년 ‘우산운동’ 외 여러 대규모 시위의 주체가 되어 조직화하고 선동하였다. 이는 궁극적으로 기존의 사회경제적 이유에 기반하여 만연하였던 반대류 정서에서 정치적 견해로 대체되었음을 시사한다.

민족주의란 고대로부터 존재해온 원초적인 실재가 아닌 근대 자본주의 발전과정에서 생겨난 상상의 산물이라는 앤더슨의 이론하에, 본토인들과

마찬가지로 동일 민족인 한족임에도 불구하고 정치적 견해와 신념에 근거한 민족주의적 요소를 띄는 홍콩의 지우링허우 세대를 집중 조명 함으로써 홍콩의 현주소를 진단하고 동시에 ‘일국양제’ 정책과 더불어 중국-홍콩 관계를 예측하고자 하였다.

본 논문은 지우링허우 세대 및 정치적 요소를 중점으로 입각하였다는 점에서 기존의 연구들과 차별된다. 기존 연구들이 대개 본질에 대한 논의보다는 경제적 요소 등의 특정 분야에 편중해 있었음을 감안하였을 때 홍콩의 정치적 요소들로 연구 분석하려 한 시도는 필요했음을 알린다. 이러한 과정을 통해, 본 논문은 홍콩은 물론 더 나아가 중국의 안정과 번영 및 양안관계 연구에 밑거름을 제시하고자 하였다.

핵심어: “상상의 공동체”, 민족주의, 종족정체성, ‘하나의 중국’, ‘일국양제’, 홍콩인, 지우링허우

학번: 2013-23729